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I. INTRODUCTION*
Municipal expansion by the annexation of surrounding territory involves
two separate and distinct procedures in Virginia. Due to the Common-
wealth's coverage under the Voting Rights Act of 1965, municipalities seek-
ing annexation must obtain federal approval in addition to satisfying the
requirements of state law. Compliance with the Act requires an affirmative
showing that the expansion is nondiscriminatory in both its purposes and
effects with regard to minority voting strength. Failure to meet these fed-
eral requirements will invalidate the annexation, irrespective of its compli-
ance with state law. This note will first examine the law of annexation in
Virginia, highlighting its uniqueness among the states, followed by an
exposition and analysis of the relevant federal mandates.
* The student contributors are Craig S. Cooley, Wade W. Massie and Carl M. Rizzo.
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II. ANNEXATION IN VIRGINIA
In Virginia, both cities' and towns2 may enlarge their boundaries by
annexation.' A municipality's power to annex,' as with all of its other
governmental functions, must be derived either through statutes or by
charter.- Nearly seventy years ago, in Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh,' the
Supreme Court recognized municipal corporations as being "political sub-
divisions of the State, created as convenient agencies for exercising such
governmental powers of the State as may be entrusted to them."7 The
same theory has been expressed in Virginia, where municipal corporations
have been called "creatures," '  "mere auxiliaries," 9 "mere local
agenc[ies]"'' and "subordinate political subdivisions"', of the state. By
general law,'2 Virginia provides for territorial expansion, and cities and
towns must fashion their annexation efforts within that framework. '3
A. CITY-COUNTY SEPARATION
The organization of local government in Virginia is unique, for nowhere
else in this country will one find statewide city-county separation." Under
1. VA. CONsT. art. VII, § 1; VA. CODE ANN. § 1-13.2 (Repl. Vol. 1973).
2. VA. CONST. art. VII, § 1; VA. CODE ANN. § 1-13.29 (Repl. Vol. 1973).
3. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-1033 (Repl. Vol. 1973). The Code deals with annexation in general
in §§ 15.1-1032 to -1058 (Repl. Vol. 1973). For literature on annexation in Virginia see the
following works: C. BAIN, ANNEXATION IN VIRGINIA (1966) [hereinafter cited as ANNEXATION IN
VIRGINIA]; C. BAIN, "A BODY INCORPORATE" - THE EVOLUTION OF CITY-COUNTY SEPARATION IN
VIRGINIA (1967) [hereinafter cited as A BODY INCORPORATE]; 13 MICHIE'S JURISPRUDENCE
Municipal Corporations §§ 11-16 (1951); Bain, Terms anid Conditions of Annexation Under
the 1952 Statute, 41 VA. L. REv. 1129 (1955); Martin & Buchholtz, Annexation - Virginia's
Dilemma, 24 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 241 (1967); McSweeney, Local Government Law in Vir-
ginia, 1870-1970, 4 U. RICH. L. REV. 174 (1969).
4. VA. CONST. art. VII, § 2; VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-1032 (Repl. Vol. 1973). See also 13
MICHIE'S JURISPRUDENCE Municipal Corporations § 2 at 362, 372-73 (1951).
5. Murray v. City of Roanoke, 192 Va. 321, 325-26, 64 S.E.2d 804, 807 (1951).
6. 207 U.S. 161 (1907).
7. Id. at 178.
8. Washington, A. & Mt. V. Ry. v. City Council, 98 Va. 344, 350, 36 S.E. 385, 387 (1900),
quoting from Burckhardt v. City of Atlanta, 103 Ga. 302, 30 S.E. 32, 35 (1898).
9. City of Richmond v. Richmond & D.R.R., 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 604, 617 (1872).
10. Jordan v. Town of South Boston, 138 Va. 838, 843, 122 S.E. 265, 266 (1924); Whiting
v. Town of West Point, 88 Va. 905, 906, 14 S.E. 698, 699 (1892).
11. Camp v. Birchett, 143 Va. 686, 692, 126 S.E. 665, 667 (1925).
12. VA. CONST. art. VII, § 2. Prior to 1902 the General Assembly could enlarge municipal
boundaries by special act. City of Falls Church v. Board of Supervisors, 193 Va. 112, 68 S.E.2d
96 (1951). An explanation of the change is provided in ANNEXATION IN VIRGINIA, supra note 3,
at 1-12.
13. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-1032 (Repl. Vol. 1973).
14. A BODY INCORPORATE, supra note 3, at ix, 23; ANNEXATION IN VIRGINIA, supra note 3, at
ix; REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON CITY-CouNTY RELATIONSHIPS, H. Doc. No. 27, at 48 (1975)
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this system, cities maintain complete independence from counties;'" they
are co-equal political subdivisions and within their own boundaries are
separate and distinct politically, governmentally and geographically.'"
The doctrine of city-county separateness, which has a most obscure ori-
gin," has long been recognized by the Virginia Supreme Court,, although
the matter has apparently never been directly at issue.'9 Some writers have
found at least tacit recognition of independence in past statutes and con-
stitutions.21 The case of Supervisors of Washington County v. Saltville
Land Co.2 provides one of the earliest and clearest recognitions of the
independence of Virginia cities. The court flatly 9tated that "[a] city is
entitled . . . to a separate government, and when incorporated is no part
of the county for governmental purposes."22 A 1971 amendment to the
Constitution of Virginia inserted the words "independent incorporated
community" into the definition of "city. '23
Unlike cities, towns are governmentally dependent on the county in
which they are geographically situated 4 and are subject to the county's
various exercises of power.2 The city is subject only to the authority of the
state and generally has all the powers granted to counties plus those addi-
tional powers granted by charter. 2 When a town annexes part of the
[hereinafter cited as STUART COMMISSION for G.R.C. Stuart, chairman]; REPORT OF THE VIR-
GINIA METROPOLITAN AREAS STUDY COMMISSION, S. Doc. No. 16, at 17 (1967) [hereinafter cited
as HAHN COMMISSION for its chairman T. Marshall Hahn, Jr.]; 24 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 241,
supra note 3; 4 U. RICH. L. REV. 174, supra note 3, at 177.
15. A BODY INCORPORATE, supra note 3, at 23-27; STUART COMMISSION, supra note 14, at 48;
4 U. RICH. L. REV. 174, supra note 3, at 175; 24 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 241, supra note 3.
16. City of Richmond v. Board of Supervisors, 199 Va. 679, 684, 101 S.E. 2d 641, 644 (1958).
17. Chester W. Bain has devoted an entire book to the evolution of this doctrine - A BODY
INCORPORATE, supra note 3.
18. See City of Richmond v. Board of Supervisors, 199 Va. 679, 101 S.E.2d 641 (1958);
County School Bd. v. School Bd., 197 Va. 845, 91 S.E.2d 654 (1956); City of Colonial Heights
v. County of Chesterfield, 196 Va. 155, 82 S.E.2d 566 (1954); County of Norfolk v. City of
Portsmouth, 186 Va. 1032, 45 S.E.2d 136 (1947); Supervisors of Washington County v. Salt-
ville Land Co., 99 Va. 640, 39 S.E.704 (1901).
19. A BODY INCORPORATE, supra note 3, at 37, 45.
20. Id. at 37-45, 51-53. See also 24 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 241, supra note 3, at 242 & n.9.
21. 99 Va. 640, 39 S.E.704 (1901).
22. Id. at 644, 39 S.E. at 705.
23. VA. CONST. art. VII, § 1. See also VA. CODE ANN. § 1-13.2 (Repl. Vol. 1973).
24. Nexsen v. Board of Supervisors, 142 Va. 313, 128 S.E. 570 (1925); Campbell v. Bryant,
104 Va. 509, 52 S.E. 638 (1905); Day v. Roberts, 101 Va. 248, 43 S.E. 362 (1903); Supervisors
of Washington County v. Saltville Land Co., 99 Va. 640, 39 S.E. 704 (1901). See, e.g., A BODY
INCORPORATE, supra note 3, at 23. The Constitution of Virginia defines town as a community
"within" a county. VA. CONST. art. VII, § 2.
25. See Supervisors of Washington County v. Saltville Land Co., 99 Va. 640, 39 S.E. 704
(1901).
26. A BODY INCORPORATE, supra note 3, at 26; 4 U. RICH. L. REV. 174, supra note 3, at 177.
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county, the county still retains control over the territory annexed.2 On the
other hand, when a city annexes part of a county, that area is completely
incorporated into the city and is no longer subject to county control.21 Since
a county loses tax revenue when its population and land area are reduced,
counties promptly contest most city annexation attempts . 2
In the context of annexation, the city-county separation can be criticized
as naturally resulting in bitterness between local governments 3 and dislo-
cation of governmental activities.3 1 However, Virginia's unique system has
received more praise than criticism, since separation has reduced overlap-
ping governmental functions, 3 increased the measure of home rule,3 3 and
simplified tax and governmental structures.3 4 City-county separation will
undoubtedly continue in Virginia due to the costs and administrative diffi-
culties which would result from the system's termination
"
.
3
Annexation proceedings may be instituted by two methods in Virginia.
First, the council of a city or town may pass an ordinance seeking annexa-
tion, and then petition the circuit court of the county in which the territory
is sought .3 Alternatively, fifty-one percent of the voters of an area adjacent
to the city or town may petition the local circuit court to be annexed to
that municipality. 37 Whether the proceeding is instituted under one
27. See 41 VA. L. REV. 1129, supra note 3, at 1130.
28. See STUART COMMISSION, supra note 14, at 49; ANNEXATION IN VIRGINIA, supra note 3, at
X.
29. See ANNEXATION IN VIRGINIA, supra note 3, at 219; A BODY INCORPORATE, supra note 3,
at 101. See also STUART COMMISSION, supra note 14, at 49; COMMISSION TO STUDY URBAN
GROWTH, ADJUSTMENT OF THE BOUNDARIES OF VIRGINIA MUNICIPALITIES AND ADJACENT COUNTIES,
H. Doc. No. 13, at 6 (1951) [hereinafter cited as COMMISSION TO STUDY URBAN GROWTH].
30. See generally ANNEXATION IN VIRGINIA, supra note 3, at x; STUART COMMISSION, supra
note 14, at 8, 49; HAHN COMMISSION, supra note 14, at 13. Bitterness and opposition have
to costly court struggles. The Stuart Commission incorporated into its report a chart showing
these costs in recent annexation proceedings. STUART COMMISSION, supra note 14, at 77-78.
31. See generally STUART COMMISSION, supra note 14, at 49; COMMISSION TO STUDY URBAN
GROWTH, supra note 29, at 6.
32. See STUART COMMISSION, supra note 14, at 49; HAHN COMMISSION, supra note 14, at 17;
COMMISSION TO STUDY URBAN GROWTH, supra note 29, at 5.
33. See A BODY INCORPORATE, supra note 3, at 100 (quoting the late Dean Pinchbeck of the
University of Richmond).
34. COMMISSION TO STUDY URBAN GROWTH, supra note 29, at 5.
35. See STUART COMMISSION, supra note 14, at 49.
36. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-1033 (Repl. Vol. 1973).
37. Id. § 15.1-1034. This section also gives the governing bodies of counties and towns the
right to petition to be annexed. Because it is the belief of voters that taxes are generally higher
in the neighboring cities than are the accompanying benefits, the second method is less
frequently employed. See County of Norfolk v. City of Portsmouth, 186 Va. 1032, 1038, 45
S.E.2d 136, 138 (1947); ANNEXATION IN VIRGINIA, supra note 3, at 60 & appendix.
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method or the other, the proponent must meet the same statutory test
before the court will award annexation.'
B. CODE REQUIREMENTS
One local judge and two remote judges, appointed by the Virginia
Supreme Court from outside the circuit, comprise the annexation court. 9
The court, sitting without a jury," determines whether annexation should
be granted and imposes the terms and conditions of the award.4' These
terms and conditions are just as important as the grant of the land itself,4 2
because a grant to which the court attaches too high a price may be finan-
cially unacceptable to the annexing municipality.
3
The annexation court has the onerous task of determining "the necessity
for and expediency of" annexation." It must consider the "best interests"
of the city or town, of the area to be annexed, of the entire county and of
the remaining portion of the county should annexation be granted. 5 The
burden of proof is on the party requesting annexation," and the Supreme
Court of Virginia will not disturb the finding of the annexation court unless
that finding is clearly erroneous or without credible evidence to support
it.47
In reviewing annexation cases, the court examines a number of factors
to determine whether annexation is necessary and expedient. These in-
clude whether there is a community of interest between the city and the
area to be annexed," what services will be provided to the new area,49
38. Johnston v. County of Fairfax, 211 Va. 378, 177 S.E.2d 606 (1970). The Code requires
that the proponent demonstrate the "necessity for and expediency of" annexation. VA. CODE
ANN. § 15.1-1041 (Repl. Vol. 1973).
39. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-1038 (Repl. Vol. 1973).
40. Id.
41. Id. §§ 15.1-1041(d), -1042.
42. 24 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 241, supra note 3, at 262.
43. For example, in 1965, Richmond declined to accept an annexation award due to the
$55 million obligation imposed by the court. City of Richmond v. United States, 422 U.S.
358, 362-63 (1975).
44. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-1041(b) (Repl. Vol. 1973).
45. Id.
46. City of Roanoke v. County of Roanoke, 214 Va. 216, 198 S.E.2d 780 (1973); Johnston
v. County of Fairfax, 211 Va. 378, 177 S.E.2d 606 (1970); County of Chesterfield v. Berberich,
199 Va. 500, 100 S.E.2d 781 (1957).
47. City of Roanoke v. County of Roanoke, 214 Va. 216, 198 S.E.2d 780 (1973); City of
Alexandria v. County of Fairfax, 212 Va. 437, 184 S.E.2d 758 (1971); Town of Narrows v. Giles
County, 184 Va. 628, 35 S.E.2d 808 (1945).
48. Johnston v. County of Fairfax, 211 Va. 378, 177 S.E.2d 606 (1970); City of Portsmouth
v. County of Norfolk, 198 Va. 247, 93 S.E.2d 296 (1956); Town of Narrows v. Giles County,
184 Va. 628, 35 S.E.2d 808 (1945).
49. Rockingham County v. Town of Timberville, 201 Va. 303, 110 S.E.2d 390 (1959).
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whether the city has the financial ability and stability to pay for the
territory,"0 crowding in the city,5 the ability of the city to develop the
territory after annexation, 52 the amount of vacant land within the city, 3
the county residents' present use of the city's services and facilities,4 the
health conditions of the county and city and the opportunity for their
improvement,5 5 the growth rate of the city,56 the availability of housing
within the city-7 and the city's future needs for development and expan-
sion.!" The opposition of local residents has never been a sufficient ground
for denying annexation . 5 The increase in revenue the city will realize and
the amount of revenue the county will lose have not been valid considera-
tions for awarding0 or denying6 annexation. No single factor controls
whether an annexation is necessary and expedient. 2 By statute, annexa-
tion courts are required to "balance the equities" in each case and render
the decision accordingly. 3
50. County of Fairfax v. Town of Fairfax, 201 Va. 362, 111 S.E.2d 428 (1959).
51. City of Roanoke v. County of Roanoke, 204 Va. 157, 129 S.E.2d 711 (1963).
52. City of Roanoke v. County of Roanoke, 214 Va. 216, 198 S.E.2d 780 (1973).
53. Id.
54. County of Henrico v. City of Richmond, 177 Va. 754, 15 S.E.2d 309 (1941).
55. Henrico County v. City of Richmond, 106 Va. 282, 55 S.E. 683 (1906).
56. Id.
57. City Council v. Alexandria County, 117 Va. 230, 84 S.E. 630 (1915).
58. Henrico County v. City of Richmond, 106 Va. 282, 55 S.E. 683 (1906).
59. County of Norfolk v. City of Portsmouth, 186 Va. 1032, 45 S.E.2d 136 (1947).
60. City of Alexandria v. County of Fairfax, 212 Va. 437, 184 S.E.2d 758 (1971).
61. Warwick County v. City of Newport News, 120 Va. 177, 90 S.E. 644 (1916).
62. County of Fairfax v. Town of Fairfax, 201 Va. 362, 111 S.E.2d 428 (1959).
63. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-1042 (Repl. Vol. 1973). The balancing process seems conducive
to resolving the complexities that the issue involves. See generally STUART COMMISSION, supra
note 14, at 33-35; REPORT OF THE VIRGINIA ADVISORY LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, ANNEXATION AND
CONSOLIDATION, H. Doc. No. 16, at 9 (1964); COMMISSION TO STUDY URBAN GROWTH, supra note
29, at 5. For example, the Code requires the court to consider the services that the city will
render and the needs of the area proposed to be annexed. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-1041(b) (Repl.
Vol. 1973). Suppose the city cannot supplement the services already offered by the county,
yet needs additional territory to relieve congestion and overcrowding. How do these valid
considerations and others mesh? What role do traditional state policies play in the proceed-
ing? For instance, it has been the policy of Virginia to keep rural areas under county govern-
ment and urban areas under city government. County of Norfolk v. City of Portsmouth, 186
Va. 1032, 455 S.E.2d 136 (1947). How does this policy square with the occasional need of cities
for undeveloped territory? Alternatively, how does this policy withstand the large scale urban-
ization of surrounding counties? Courts respond by "balancing the benefits and injuries to
the parties concerned," County of Fairfax v. Town of Fairfax, 201 Va. 362, 366, 111 S.E.2d
428, 432 (1959), and by "act[ing] more as chancellors in equity than courts of law operating
under the strict rules of stare decisis." ANNEXATION IN VIRGINIA, supra note 3, at 215.
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C. STUART COMMISSION
In 1971 the Virginia General Assembly imposed a moratorium on city-
initiated annexation" and created the Commission on City-County Rela-
tionships, popularly known as the Stuart Commission, to study and
recommend changes or additions in annexation law.8 The Stuart Commis-
sion submitted its recommendations to the Governor and General Assem-
bly in January of 1975.
The Commission recommended that the two most fundamental
characteristics of Virginia annexation, city-county separation 6 and judi-
cial determination, remain unchanged. It was noted that city-county sep-
aration should remain since it prevents duplication of effort and overlap-
ping jurisdictions, and because the expense of change would be too great.66
The Commission favored retention of the judicial process as the mecha-
nism for resolving the annexation questions because it felt that courts can
be responsive to the complex issues involved, cognizant of state and re-
gional concerns, and flexible in the face of changing urban problems.
69
Among the modifications recommended were two amendments designed
to insure that, at an annexation trial, a city be permitted to cure purely
technical defects rather than be penalized by a mandatory delay prior to
a corrective suit.7" Under the existing statute, a city failing in a suit due
to such a defect in the annexation ordinance is barred for five years from
instituting another proceeding against the county." The Commission also
recommended that in contested annexation cases all three judges be from
remote judicial circuits,7" believing that accusations of bias and conflict of
interest create an antagonistic atmosphere that outweighs the value of
local expertise and familiarity.3 Another proposal was a provision that
64. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-1032.1 (Repl. Vol. 1973), as amended (Cum. Supp. 1975).
65. STUART COMMISSION, supra note 14, at 7-8. The Commission was also to examine size
requirements for new cities and city status for counties. Id. at 7-8.
66. Id. at 48-49.
67. Id. at 33-35.
68. Id. at 49.
69. Id. at 33.
70. Id. at 37-38; VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-1046, -1055 (Repl. Vol. 1973). The purpose of the
waiting period is to relieve the county of the burden of defending a rapid succession of
annexation suits. City of Charlottesville v. County of Albemarle, 214 Va. 365, 370, 200 S.E.2d
551, 555 (1973).
71. City of Charlottesville v. County of Albemarle, 214 Va. 365, 200 S.E.2d 551 (1973).
The Commission felt that the General Assembly should correct this injustice and thereby
eliminate the possibility for five years of smoldering discontent and unnecessary local dishar-
mony. STUART COMMISSION, supra note 14, at 37.
72. STUART COMMISSION, supra note 14, at 40-41.
73. Id. at 41.
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would allow the court to divide the issues of annexation, hearing the ne-
cessity and expediency question separately before receiving evidence on
other issues.74 The Commission also recommended that a list of factors to
be considered by the court be incorporated into the annexation statutes.7 ,
For more effective and economically viable local government, the Stuart
Commission suggested that the population criterion for independent city
status be raised from five thousand 7 to twenty-five thousand residents,
with a minimum density of two hundred persons per square mile. 7 In
addition to improving the financial base of the future Virginia city,70 this
proposal would ease county opposition to town annexations since the
town's potential independence would be greatly reduced.
The Stuart Commission further recommended a procedure whereby a
county could unilaterally incorporate as a city.79 The same criteria pro-
posed for independent cities would apply."0 While this would prevent new
cities from rising within the old county boundaries, it is uncertain how city
status for a county would affect future annexation attempts by neighboring
cities. In City of Portsmouth v. City of Chesapeake,8' the Supreme Court
of Virginia held that a city could continue its annexation suit against a
territory which, though presently part of a city, was part of a county when
the proceedings were instituted.8 2 The court stated in dictum that
"[tihere is no constitutional prohibition against annexation by a city of
a portion of the territory of another city."" However, the existing statutes
seem to contemplate city and town annexation of county territory, and the
74. Id. at 38-39. This would eliminate unnecessary testimony concerning the terms and
conditions of boundary change should the proponent fail the "necessary and expedient" test.
Id.
75. Id. at 41-44. It should be remembered, however, that a court's decision already involves
a balancing process in which many factors are evaluated. The General Assembly should
carefully consider whether this list of statutory factors would saddle the court with unneces-
sary inquiry into matters which are inapplicable or inconclusive in certain cases. A confidence
in the past success of judicial flexibility should override the fear that the court might leave
one factor unexamined.
76. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-978 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
77. STUART COMMISSION, supra note 14, at 50-52. Other study commissions have recom-
mended similar changes: REPORT OF THE VIRGINIA ADVISORY LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, ANNEXATION
AND CONSOLIDATION, H. Doc. No. 16, at 9 (1964); COMMISSION TO STUDY URBAN GROWTH, supra
note 29, at 9. Chester W. Bain has also recommended an increase. ANNEXATION IN VIRGINIA,
supra note 3, at 235-36.
78. STUART COMMISSION, supra note 14, at 50-52.
79. Id. at 56-62.
80. Id. at 50-51, 57.
81. 205 Va. 259, 136 S.E.2d 817 (1964).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 264, 136 S.E.2d at 822.
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consolidation statutes apparently envision a process whereby two entire
cities become one, rather than one city feeding on a portion of another.
If city status for counties does not insure protection against neighboring
city annexation, there is one Stuart Commission proposal which would
conclusively settle the issue. The Commission recommended that certain
counties be granted immunity both from involuntary city annexation and
also from incorporation of new cities within.8 To be eligible, a county must
have a population of twenty-five thousand persons and an average density
of two hundred persons per square mile.85 Additionally, the court must
determine that the county is providing and will continue to provide serv-
ices comparable to those of nearby cities and that immunity is in the best
interests of the Commonwealth. 6 Finally, recognizing that immunity could
leave certain cities in severe economic straits, the Commission suggested
that the General Assembly could provide needy cities with some sort of
financial assistance, including housing and public transportation pro-
grams."' Cities could also receive more assistance for their law enforcement
programs,s similar to that presently being received by counties. Such pro-
grams would spread the financial burden more equitably throughout the
Commonwealth. 9
Annexation under Virginia law is not an automatic process," and the
84. STUART COMMISSION, supra note 14, 29-31.
85. Id. at 31.
86. Id. The Commission cited the rapid urbanization of some counties, the full range of
services that those counties provide, and the bitterness and exorbitant costs attending annex-
ation as reasons for the grant of immunity. Id. at 26-29. According to the Commission,
immunity against city incorporation will prevent fragmentation in local government and
preserve the "territorial integrity of the parent county." Id. at 29. The Commission con-
cluded:
In short, as counties have become vehicles for the delivery of urban services, city
arguments in favor of boundary expansion have tended to shift from service provision
to the maintenance of the political, economic, and social viability of the city itself.
Annexation, instead of serving as a means to distribute city benefits to once rural
areas, has become a means of extending to suburban residents their share of the
operating costs and social responsibilities of a city upon which they ultimately depend.
Id. at 28.
87. Id. at 68.
88. Id. at 71. The Stuart Commission recommended no specific assistance programs, and
the cities will probably argue that indeed none will be forthcoming from the General Assem-
bly. Cities might point out that, without the ability to expand their tax base through annexa-
tion, they may face either a serious economic decline, an abrogation of their independence,
or both.
89. Id. at 68.
90. On February 9, 1976, three members of the Stuart Commission offered House Bill No.
855 to the General Assembly. This bill substantially incorporated the recommendations set
forth in the Stuart Commission Report. The major provisions of the bill included:
19761
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procedure for initiating a valid boundary expansion does not end in the
state courts. The complexities reach new levels with the introduction of
federal questions pursuant to the fifteenth amendment.
III. ANNEXATION AND THE FIFTEENTH AMENDMENT TO
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
The fifteenth amendment states that "[tihe right of citizens of the
United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States
or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servi-
tude." 9' This language has always been interpreted as self-executing92 and
has been construed to invalidate state voting requirements which discrimi-
nate either on their face or in practice.9" While states have "broad powers
to determine the conditions under which the right of suffrage may be
exercised,"9 the provisions of the fifteenth amendment override any con-
trary exercise of state authority.9 - State power cannot be used as an instru-
ment to circumvent a federally-protected right.96
The first successful fifteenth amendment challenge to an annexation
came in Gomillion v. Lightfoot.97 The city of Tuskegee, Alabama redrew
(1) independent city status for counties,
(2) immunity from establishment of new cities within counties,
(3) an immunity status for counties that would bar city-initiated annexations, and
(4) an absolute defense for counties which could be used against particular city-
initiated annexation attempts, should the full immunity status not be sought.
The requirements for each of these benefits are basically the same. The county must have
a population of 25,000 with a minimum density of 200 residents per square mile. The county
should be able to show that it provides services comparable to those of cities, and that the
"best interests" of the state and area will be served by the action. Independent city status,
alone, requires majority approval by the voters of the county.
House Bill No. 855 was carried over to the 1977 Session.
91. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1.
92. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 325 (1966).
93. Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145 (1965); Alabama v. United States, 371 U.S.
37 (1962); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960); United States v. Thomas, 362 U.S. 58
(1960); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Schnell v. Davis, 336 U.S. 933 (1949); Smith v.
Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939); Myers v. Anderson, 238
U.S. 368 (1915); Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915); Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370
(1881).
94. Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 91 (1965).
95. U.S. CONST. art. VI states in part: "This Constitution ... shall be the supreme Law
of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitu-
tion or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding."
96. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 347 (1960), cited in South Carolina v. Katzen-
bach, 383 U.S. 301, 325 (1966).
97. 364 U.S. 339 (1960). Jurisdiction had been denied at the district court level, 167 F.
Supp. 405 (M.D. Ala. 1958), and at the circuit court level, 270 F.2d 594 (5th Cir. 1959).
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its boundaries from a perfect square to a twenty-eight-sided figure, thereby
adding some white voters, while excluding almost all black voters. The
disenfranchised blacks sought a declaratory judgment, claiming the stat-
ute would deny them the right to vote as protected by the fifteenth amend-
ment. In granting this relief, the Supreme Court noted that "[a]cts gener-
ally lawful may become unlawful when done to accomplish an unlawful
end,""8 and that "a constitutional power cannot be used by way of condi-
tion to attain an unconstitutional result."99
As urban black populations have increased, urban white populations
have declined.' 0 This inverse relationship has produced either black popu-
lation majorities or significant minorities in many urban centers."' , Some
white political power structures have responded to growing black voter
strength by gerrymandering voting districts, instituting malapportionment
schemes, or simply failing to reapportion to give black voters full represen-
tation.'02 Thus, black voters were denied an opportunity to elect represent-
atives attuned to their needs.10O
The development of significant black voting strength in the inner-city
complicated the annexation problem. While there are many valid reasons
for annexation,"' a simultaneous dilution of black voting strength often
98. 364 U.S. at 347, citing United States v. Reading Co., 226 U.S. 324, 357 (1912).
99. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Foster, 247 U.S. 105, 114 (1918). For further discussion see
Lucas, Dragon in the Thicket: A Perusal of Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 1961 S. CT. REV. 194.
100. See C. Cooley, An Argument for the Unconstitutionality of De Facto Racial Segrega-
tion in Public Education, 7-36, March, 1975 (unpublished thesis in University of Richmond
Library) for a discussion of population and demographic trends in metropolitan areas.
101. Estimated 1970 black population percentages: Washington, D.C., 68%; Chicago, 32%;
Philadelphia, 32%; Detroit, 47%; Baltimore, 47%; Cleveland, 38%; St. Louis, 46%; New
Orleans, 45%; Memphis, 39%; Atlanta, 39%; Newark, 46%; Oakland, 39%; Richmond, 52%;
Birmingham, 40%. Revolution in Civil Rights, CONGRESSIONAL QUARTRLY SERVICE, June,
1968, at 117.
102. For further discussion of these practices see Note, Chavis v. Whitcomb: Apportion-
ment, Gerrymandering, and Black Voting Rights, 24 RUTGERS L. REv. 521 (1970); Note,
Political Gerrymandering: The Law and Politics of Partisan Districting, 36 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 144 (1967).
103. A traditional goal of all minority groups has been to elect a member of their minority
to political office, "not only as a means of providing for a person in government who will be
reponsive to their needs, but also as a symbol that this minority group has achieved a measure
of total citizenship." Note, Chavis v. Whitcomb: Apportionment, Gerrymandering, and Black
Voting Rights, 24 RUTGERS L. REV. 521, 523 n.12 (1970). See also A. DOWNS, URBAN PROBLEMS
AND PROSPECTS (1970); T. DYE, THE POLITICS OF EQUALITY (1971); LUBELL, THE FUTURE OF
AMERICAN POLITICS (1952).
104. Examples would be: increasing the residential and commercial tax base (not valid in
Virginia, but acceptable in the federal courts); and gaining additional vacant lands for growth
of industry and service facilities (schools, power plants, etc.). See notes 48-63 supra and
accompanying text.
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occurs, and the question is then raised whether the annexation was raci-
ally motivated.
The judiciary has been reluctant to review questions of "political" gerry-
mandering, '0 5 but has made exceptions for "racial" gerrymandering, which
is within the traditional sphere of constitutional litigation.'," However, the
mere dilution of voting strength has been held to be insufficient to invoke
constitutional review pursuant to the fourteenth and fifteenth amend-
ments.' 7 It has therefore never been clearly held that dilution of minority
group voting strength through annexation is violative of the fifteenth
amendment.
In Holt v. City of Richmond,' s a suit was brought under the fifteenth
amendment by black residents of the city of Richmond, Virginia against
the city and its council, claiming racially motivated purposes in bargaining
with the adjoining county of Chesterfield to acquire the additional white
voters needed to maintain control of the city council. The court found that,
although the initial annexation proceedings against the county had not
been motivated by an effort to dilute the vote of black citizens, '" circum-
stances had changed by the time of the 1969 compromise." The judge
determined that the purpose and effect was to thwart political control by
blacks. The court interpreted "deprivation of one's vote by reason of race"
to include dilution as well. It found ample basis in the testimony presented
105. See WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 382 U.S. 4, 6 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring); Sincock
v. Gately, 262 F. Supp. 739, 829-33 (D. Del. 1967). See also Note, Political Gerrymandering:
The Law and Politics of Partisan Districting, 36 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 144 (1967).
106. "Considerable debate, however, has arisen concerning whether the complaint should
be structured in terms of an alleged violation of 14th or 15th amendment rights." Note,
Chavis v. Whitcomb: Apportionment, Gerrymandering, and Black Voting Rights, 24 RUTGERS
L. REV. 521, 525 n.15 (1970). Compare Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52 (1964), with Gomil-
lion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
107. Mann v. Davis, 245 F. Supp. 241 (E.D. Va. 1965), aff'd mem. sub. nom. Burnette v.
Davis, 382 U.S. 42 (1965). Based on population statistics, thb city of Richmond, Virginia was
entitled to five representatives in the General Assembly and adjacent Henrico County was
entitled to three. An eight man, multimember district was formed, thereby reducing the 42%
black population of the city to 29% of the multimember district. This decision preceded, of
course, Virginia's inclusion under the Voting Rights Act of 1965. But the opinion would be
precedent for non-covered areas. The Court affirmed the district court's determination that
even the concept of one-man, one-vote "neither connotes nor envisages representation accord-
ing to color. Certainly it does not demand an alignment of districts to assure success at the
polls of any race. No line may be drawn to prefer by race or color." Mann v. Davis, supra at
245.
108. 334 F. Supp. 228 (E.D. Va. 1971), rev'd, 459 F.2d 1093 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 408
U.S. 931 (1972).
109. Id. at 231.
110. Id. at 236.
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on which to determine a discriminatory purpose or motive for the compro-
mise annexation."' Finally, the councilmanic election of 1970 was found
to be "tainted" and new elections were ordered." 2 The court refused to
order deannexation but created two new councilmanic districts."13
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding the "unconstitu-
tional motivation" too remote from the judicial annexation decree to war-
rant a grant of any relief."' According to the court, ostensibly constitu-
tional legislation may not be stricken on grounds of suspect motivation
unless the legislative purpose is both obvious and constitutionally imper-
missible."15 The court found nothing sinister in official concern that Rich-
mond was becoming a "city of the old, the poor and the Black.""' 6 Since
Richmond initially sought the annexation for totally valid and compelling
reasons, and those reasons continued to exist at the time of annexation,
there was no violation of the fifteenth amendment."7
111. Mayor Bagley of Richmond negotiated the compromise which allowed the annexation
of a 23 square mile area (the initial suit sought 51 square miles) and reduced the 1970 black
population percentage from 51.5 percent to 42 percent by the addition of 47,000 voters (95
percent of whom were white). The county of Chesterfield agreed not to appeal the compro-
mise. This had the effect of allowing the annexation to become effective on January 1, 1970
(VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-1041 (Repl. Vol. 1973)) and in time for the 1970 councilmanic elections.
The district court found that during the compromise meetings Mr. Bagley "did not have the
detailed information required to effectively evaluate any tentatively agreed upon line except
for the size of the area and the fact that there was a sufficient number of white population
which could reasonably be expected to dilute the potential Negro vote so as to preclude
legislative control by that segment of the population in 1970." Id. at 235.
112. Id. at 239.
113. These were close to, but not exactly the same as, the old city and the annexed area.
Id. at 240.
114. 459 F.2d at 1094.
115. Id. at 1098. See Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971); United States v. O'Brien,
391 U.S. 367, 383-84 (1968); Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 130 (1810). For additional
discussion of the problems involved in judicial analysis of motivation, see Brest, Palmer v.
Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of Unconstitutional Legislative Motive, 1971 S. CT.
REV. 95; Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J.
1205, 1217-18 (1970); The Supreme Court, 1970 Term, 85 HARV. L. REV. 38, 86-95 (1971).
116. "There is nothing sinister in such concern. It is simply recognition in Richmond of a
problem common to most of our cities throughout the United States. As the more affluent
residents move to suburbs, central cities encounter a multitude of problems, including a
declining tax base with which to support services for which there is an ever increasing de-
mand. Where it is practical, an obvious and traditional answer has been extension of the city's
boundaries to encompass developing residential and industrial areas." 459 F.2d at 1096. But
if the concern was truly not racial, but rather economic, and the officials equated the terms
black and poor, then why was not the concern merely that Richmond would become a city of
the old and the poor?
117. Id. at 1099-1100. Judge Butzner gave a strong dissenting opinion and would have
required deannexation. Id. at 1100-08.
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IV. FEDERAL LEGISLATION ENACTED PURSUANT TO THE
FIFTEENTH AMENDMENT
A. BEFORE 1965
Ratification of the fifteenth amendment in 1870 was followed by imme-
diate enactment of the Enforcement Act of 1870."1 Under that Act, inter-
ference with a citizen's right to vote became a federal crime."' A year later,
an amendment to the Act established a system of federal supervisors of
elections.' 0 There was no futher legislation enacted to enforce the fifteenth
amendment until the Civil Rights Act of 1957, which authorized the Attor-
ney General to institute suits on behalf of private individuals to secure
voting rights.' 2' Additional legislation in 1960 '22 provided that, if charges
of voter discrimination were sustained in a suit instituted by the govern-
ment, the Attorney General could request the court to determine whether
the individuals concerned were deprived of their rights by a "pattern or
practice" of discrimination. The Civil Rights Act of 1964'2 granted further
relief. Of equal importance concerning voting rights was the 1964 reappor-
tionment decision of Reynolds v. Sims,' 24 which held that the equal protec-
tion clause required seats in both houses of a bicameral state legislature
to be apportioned on the basis of population.
B. THE VOTING RIGHTS ACr OF 1965
The Voting Rights Act of 1965'2 has become the greatest single hurdle
to Virginia municipalities seeking the annexation of surrounding territo-
ries. It was passed by Congress upon the authority of section 2 of the
fifteenth amendment.'2 Among the general provisions of the Voting Rights
Act, section 2 prohibits the imposition or application of any racially
discriminatory voting qualification or prerequisite to a voting standard,
118. Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140.
119. Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, §§ 4-6, 19, 16 Stat. 141, 144-45.
120. Act of Feb. 28, 1871, ch. 99, 16 Stat. 433.
121. 42 U.S.C. § 1971(c) (1970).
122. 42 U.S.C. § 1975(h) (1970).
123. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1975a-d, 2000a to h-4 (1970).
124. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
125. For a complete legislative history of the Act see Hearings on H.R. 6400 Before Sub-
comm. No. 5 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965); 111 CoNG.
REC. (daily ed. April 22, 23, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30; May 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 17, 18, 19,
20, 21, 24, 25, 26; July 6, 7, 8, 9; Aug. 3, 4, 1965). For a discussion of the legislative proceedings
see J. Spell, The Voting Rights Act of 1965, August 1, 1966 (unpublished thesis in University
of Richmond library).
126. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 2 states: "The Congress shall have power to enforce this
article by appropriate legislation."
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practice, or procedure.12I Section 3 authorizes courts to apply the remedies
established in the special provisions of the Act in suits brought by the
Attorney General to enforce the fifteenth amendment.'1 Several sections
provide civil and criminal penalties for violations of the Act.'29
The uniqueness of the Voting Rights Act is in its "special provisions,"
specifically sections 4 and 5.130 Section 4 provides a nondiscretionary, auto-
matic formula, or "trigger," by which states or their political subdivisions
are made subject to the Act's remedies. ' Virginia was determined by the
127. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1970).
128. 42 U.S.C. § 1973a (1970). The special provisions are discussed in detail in notes 130,
131, and 138 infra.
129. 42 U.S.C. § 1973i-1 (1970).
130. The special provisions include sections 4 through 9. Sections 6 through 9 provide for
the assignment of federal examiners to "list" eligible persons for registration by state officials
in the covered jurisdictions and observers to report on the conduct of elections in some of the
jurisdictions designated by the Attorney General for federal examiners. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973d-
g (1970).
131. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b (1970). Section 4 is reprinted with the most recent (1975)
amendments italicized:
§ 1973b (a) To assure that the right of citizens of the United States to vote is not denied
or abridged on account of race or color, no citizen shall be denied the right to vote in
any Federal, State, or local election because of his failure to comply with any test or
device in any State with respect to which such determinations have been made under
the first two sentences of subsection (b) of this section or in any political subdivision
with respect to which such determinations have been made as a separate unit, unless
the United States District Court for the District of Columbia in an action for a declara-
tory judgment brought by such State or subdivision against the United States has
determined that no such test or device has been used during the seventeen years
preceding the filing of the action for the purpose or with the effect of denying or
abridging the right to vote on account of race or color: Provided, That no such declara-
tory judgment shall issue with respect to any plaintiff for a period of seventeen years
after the entry of a final judgment of any court of the United States, other than the
denial of a declaratory judgment under this section, whether entered prior to or after
the enactment of this subchapter, determining that denials or abridgments of the right
to vote on account of race or color through the use of such tests or devices have occurred
anywhere in the territory of such plaintiff.
An action pursuant to this subsection shall be heard and determined by a court of
three judges in accordance with the provisions of section 2284 of Title 28 and any
appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court. The court shall retain jurisdiction of any action
pursuant to this subsection for five years after judgment and shall reopen the action
upon motion of the Attorney .General alleging that a test or device has been used for
the purpose or with the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of
race or color, or in contravention of the guarantees set forth in section 4(f)(2).
If the Attorney General determines that he has no reason to believe that any such
test or device has been used during the seventeen years preceding the filing of the
action for the purpose or with the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on
account of race or color, he shall consent to the entry of such judgment.
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Attorfiey General to be a "covered jurisdiction" in 1965.' 32
Section 4(a) of the Voting Rights Act provides that a covered jurisdiction
may exempt itself from special coverage if it can persuade the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia that any test or device
which it maintained in the past did not have the "purpose or effect" of
discriminating on the basis of race.' 31 Virginia filed an exemption suit
which was denied in 1974 by the district court.3 4 The court, following the
§ 1973b (b) The provisions of subsection (a) of this section shall apply in any State or
in any political subsivision of a state which (1) the Attorney General determines
maintained on November 1, 1964, any test or device and with respect to which (2) the
Director of the Census determines that less than 50 per centum of the persons of voting
age residing therein were registered on November 1, 1964, or that less than 50 per
centum of such persons voted in the presidential election of November 1964. On and
after August 6, 1970, in addition to any State or political subdivision of a State deter-
mined to be subject to subsection (a) of this section pursuant to the previous sentence,
the provisions of subsection (a) of this section shall apply in any State or any political
subdivision of a State which (i) the Attorney General determines maintained on No-
vember 1, 1968, any test or device, and with respect to which (ii) the Director of the
Census determines that less than 50 per centum of such persons voted in the presiden-
tial election of November 1968. On and after August 6, 1975, in addition to any State
or political subdivision of a State determined to be subject to subsection (a) pursuant
to the previous two sentences, the provisions of subsection (a) shall apply in any State
or any political subdivision of a State which (i) the Attorney General determines
maintained on November 1, 1972, any test or device, and with respect to which (ii)
the Director of the Census determines that less than 50 per centum of the citizens of
voting age were registered on November 1, 1972, or that less than 50 per centum of
such persons voted in the Presidential election of November 1972.
A determination or certification of the Attorney General or of the Director of the
Census under this section or under section 1973d or 1973k of this title shall not be
reviewable in any court and shall be effective upon publication in the Federal Register.
§ 1973b (c) The phrase "test or device" shall mean any requirement that a person as
a prerequisite for voting or registration for voting (1) demonstrate the ability to read,
write, understand, or interpret any matter, (2) demonstrate any educational achieve-
ment or his knowledge of any particular subject, (3) possess such moral character, or
(4) prove his qualifications by the voucher of registered voters or members of any other
class.
§ 1973b (d) For purposes of this section no State or political subdivision shall be
determined to have engaged in the use of tests or devices for the purpose or with the
effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color, or in con-
travention of the guarantees set forth in section 4(f)(2) if (1) incidents of such use
have been few in number and have been promptly and effectively corrected by State
or local action, (2) the continuing effect of such incidents has been eliminated, and
(3) there is no reasonable probability of their recurrence in the future.
132. 30 Fed. Reg. 9897 (1965).
133. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1973b (a) (1976).
134. Virginia v. United States, 386 F. Supp. 1319 (D.D.C. 1974), aff'd, 420 U.S. 901 (1975).
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Supreme Court decision of Gaston County v. United States,1 3 found that
past de jure segregation which produced inferior black schools made the
literacy test a much greater burden on Virginia's blacks than on its
whites.'3 16
Section 5 of the 1965 Act freezes the electoral laws and procedures of
covered jurisdictions as of November 1, 1964, and prohibits enforcement
of any changes until certification by the Attorney General or the District
Court for the District of Columbia that the changes are not discriminatory
in purpose or effect.' 7 Specifically, the section requires that covered juris-
dictions submit in advance any changes in voting qualification, prerequis-
ite to voting, or standard, practice or procedure with respect to voting: (1)
to the Attorney General who will object within sixty days or allow the
changes to become effective; or (2) to the United States District Court for
the District of Columbia. 38 The intent of section 5 preclearance was to
135. 395 U.S. 285 (1969).
136. Virginia v. United States, 386 F. Supp. 1319, 1323 (D.D.C. 1974). Virginia's schools
were segregated by law pursuant to VA. CONsT. art. IX, § 140 (1902) and VA. CODE ANN. §
22-221 (1950) (repealed by Acts 1971, Ex. Sess., c. 102). The decision notes with approval the
comments of Attorney General Katzenbach that "years of violation of the 14th amendment
right of equal protection through equal education ... [should not] ... become the excuse
for continuing violation of the fifteenth amendment, right to vote." Hearings on S. 1564
Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1965), as cited in Virginia
v. United States, 386 F. Supp. 1319, 1323 (D.D.C. 1974) and Gaston County v. United States,
395 U.S. 285, 289 (1969).
Putting weight on affidavits of fearful blacks, the district court found "the difference
between black and white registration rates, and the historical common sense in forming
expectations of how illiterate black people who grew up in a period of segregation and bigotry
will behave, negate the claim that Virginia's provision of a segregated, inferior education did
not affect its voting rolls." Virginia v. United States, 386 F. Supp. 1319, 1325 (D.D.C. 1974).
137. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1973c (1976). This process is often referred to as "preclearance." For a
discussion of section 5 remedies see Roman, Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act: The Forma-
tion of an Extraordinary Federal Remedy, 22 AM. U.L. REv. 111 (1972).
138. The entirety of section 5 is set out below. The most recent (1975) amendments are
italicized.
§ 1973c Whenever a State or political subdivision with respect to which the prohibi-
tions set forth in section 1973b (b) of this title are in effect shall enact or seek to
administer any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or
procedure with respect to voting different from that in force or effect on November 1,
1964, or whenever a State or political subdivision with respect to which the prohibi-
tions set forth in section 1973b.(a) of this title based upon determinations made under
the second sentence of section 1973b (b) of this title are in effect shall enact or seek to
administer any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or
procedure with respect to voting different from that in force or effect on November 1,
1968, or whenever a State or political subdivision with respect to which the prohibi-
tions set forth in section 4(a) based upon determinations made under the third sen-
tence of section 4(b) are in effect shall enact or seek to administer any voting qualifica-
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prevent the substitution of new discriminatory laws and procedures for old
ones. 31 The burden is on the jurisdiction to submit any change for approval
and to prove that the proposed change is neither discriminatory in effect
nor in purpose. Both private parties and the Justice Department may sue
to enjoin implementation of any change which has not been submitted.'I "
Sections 4 and 5 were upheld as constitutional in South Carolina v.
Katzenbach,'4 1 where the Court rejected South Carolina's argument that
the Act be voided as an invasion of the "reserved powers of the states."
2
Regulations implementing section 5 were not promulgated until 1971.
Since Perkins v. Matthews,' annexations have been included in the list
tion or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting
different from that in force or effect on November 1, 1972, such State or subdivision
may institute an action in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia
for a declaratory judgment that such qualification, prerequisite to voting, or standard,
practice, br procedure does not have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying
or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color, or in contravention of the
guarantees set forth in section 4(f) (2), and unless and until the court enters such
judgment no person shall be denied the right to vote for failure to comply with such
qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure: Provided, That such qual-
ification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure may be enforced without such
proceeding if the qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure has been
submitted by the chief legal officer or other appropriate official of such State or subdi-
vision to the Attorney General and the Attorney General has not interposed an objec-
tion within sixty days after such submission, or upon good cause shown, to facilitate
an expedited approval within sixty days after such submission, the Attorney General
has affirmatively indicated that such objection will not be made. Neither an affirma-
tive indication by the Attorney General that no objection will be made, nor the Attor-
ney General's failure to object, nor a declaratory judgment entered under this section
shall bar a subsequent action to enjoin enforcement of such qualification, prerequisite,
standard, practice, or procedure. In the event the Attorney General affirmatively indi-
cates that no objection will be made within the sixty-day period following receipt of a
submission, the Attorney General may reserve the right to re-examine the submission
if additional information comes to his attention during the remainder of the sixty-day
period which would otherwise require objection in accordance with this section. Any
action under this section shall be heard and determined by a court of three judges in
accordance with the provisions of section 2284 of Title 28 and any appeal shall lie to
the Supreme Court.
139. UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT: TEN YEARS
AFrER 25 (1975).
140. Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969).
141. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966). For more detailed discussions of
the Act's constitutionality see Christopher, The Constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act
of 1965, 18 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1965); 41 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 270 (1966); Note, Federal Protection
of Negro Voting Rights, 51 VA. L. REV. 1051 (1965).
142. "As against the reserved powers of the States, Congress may use any rational means
to effectuate the constitutional prohibition of racial discrimination in voting." South Carolina
v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 324 (1966).
143. 400 U.S. 379 (1971).
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of actions constituting changes affecting voting.'44 The regulations also give
a detailed and extensive statement as to what must be included in any
submission of a proposed change.'45 To date fifteen Virginia cities, other
than Richmond and Petersburg, have submitted proposed annexations to
the Justice Department under section 5 requirements.'46
V. ANNEXATIONS AND THE MANDATES OF SECTION 5
A. THE PROCEDURAL MANDATE OF SECTION 5: QUESTIONS OF COVERAGE
In 1969 the Supreme Court consolidated four cases'47 involving the appli-
cation of the Voting Rights Act in Allen v. State Board of Elections,'45 and
expounded on the requirements of section 5 by deciding four principal
issues. First, individual citizens have standing in section 5 cases.' Second,
federal district-courts other than for the District of Columbia have jurisdic-
144. 28 C.F.R. § 51.4 (Supp. 1975) states: "Section 5 requires that, prior to enforcement
of any change affecting voting, the State or political subdivision which has enacted or seeks
to administer the change affecting voting must obtain either a judicial or an executive deter-
mination that denial or abridgment of the right to vote on account of race or color is not the
purpose and will not be the effect of the change.
(c) Legislation and administrative actions constituting changes affecting voting covered by
section 5 include...
(3) Any change in the constituency of an official or the boundaries of a voting unit (e.g.,
through redistricting, annexation, or reapportionment). .
145. 28 C.F.R. § 51.10 (Supp. 1975).
146. In alphabetical order: Alexandria, Feb. 23, 1973; Blacksburg (Montgomery County),
March 29, 1972; Blackstone (Nottoway County), Jan. 23, 1974; Bristol, Jan. 18, 1974; Crewe
(Nottoway County), Sept. 21, 1972; Danville (three annexations), April 2, 1973; Farmville,
Aug. 18, 1971; Hopewell, Sept. 27, 1971; Kenbridge (Lunenburg County) (three annexations),
April 12, 1972; Lovettsville (Loudoun County), May 21, 1973; Lynchburg, March 11, 1975;
Victoria (Lunenburg County) (annexation and charter), Dec. 23, 1971; Wakefield (Sussex
County), March 22, 1974; Winchester, June 17, 1971; Wytheville (Wythe County), Feb. 2,
1972. Furnished by Sidney Bixler, Civil Rights Division, U.S. Department of Justice.
147. Fairley v. Patterson, 282 F. Supp. 164 (S.D. Miss. 1967) (changed counties from ward
plan to at-large elections of 5 supervisors); Bunton v. Patterson, 281 F. Supp. 918 (S.D. Miss.
1967) (county superintendent of education made appointive office in 11 counties where pre-
viously optional to elect or appoint); Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 268 F. Supp. 218 (E.D.
Va. 1967); Whitley v. Johnson, 260 F. Supp. 630 (S.D. Miss. 1966) (changed requirements
for independent candidates running in general elections). Mississippi district court judges
held that none of these amendments to the Mississippi Code were within the purview of
section 5.
148. 393 U.S. 544 (1969).
149. "The guarantee of section 5 that no person shall be denied the right to vote for failure
to comply with an unapproved new enactment subject to section 5, might well prove an empty
promise unless the private citizen were allowed to seek judicial enforcement of the prohibi-
tion." Id. at 557.
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tion to hear section 5 questions.'50 Third, the Court required the use of a
three-judge panel to hear "coverage" questions in the federal district
courts.' 5' The fourth and perhaps most important question presented was
whether particular state actions challenged therein were subject to section
5.1 2 The Court determined that Congress intended to reach "any state
enactment which altered the election law of a covered State in even a
minor way."' 53 The Court then cited Reynolds v. Sims' 4 as holding that
the right to vote can be affected by a dilution of voting power as well as
by ar absolute prohibition on casting a ballot.'.
5
Although the decision in Allen did not directly address the issue of
whether annexations were included in the submission requirements under
section 5, it was arguable that annexations alter state election laws in more
than a "minor way" and would be changed procedure with respect to
voting as covered by the Act. Two years after Allen, the Court formally
ruled that changing boundary lines by annexation which increases a city's
number of eligible voters constitutes a change of "standard, practice, or
procedure with respect to voting" as envisaged by section 5.'1
In Perkins v. Matthews,'57 the appellants were black voters and candi-
dates for mayor or alderman in the 1969 city elections of Canton, Missis-
sippi. They had sought to enjoin the election in the local federal district
court' '0 due to the city's effort to enforce, without securing prior federal
150. After noting that an action for declaratory judgment brought by the State pursuant
to section 5 requires an adjudication that a new enactment does not have the purpose or effect
of racial discrimination, the Court held:
A declaratory judgment action brought by a private litigant does not require the Court
to reach this difficult substantive issue. The only issue is whether a particular state
enactment is subject to the provisions of the Voting Rights Act, and therefore must
be submitted for approval before enforcement. The difference in the magnitude of
these two issues suggests that Congress did not intend that both can be decided only
by the District of Columbia District Court. Indeed, the specific grant of jurisdiction
to the district courts in § 12(f) indicates Congress intended to treat 'coverage' questions
differently from 'substantive discrimination' questions. Id. at 558-59.
151. "In drafting § 5, Congress apparently concluded that if the governing authorities of a
State differ with the Attorney General of the United States concerning the purpose or effect
of a change in voting procedures, it is inappropriate to have that difference resolved by a
single district judge." Id. at 562.
152. Id. at 563.
153. Id. at 566.
154. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
155. Id. at 555; Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 569 (1969).
156. Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379, 388-89 (1971).
157. 400 U.S. 379 (1971).
158. Allen had held that private litigants could bring suit for declaratory and injunctive
relief in local three-judge district courts concerning coverage questions under section 5. 393
U.S. at 554-63. See notes 149-51 supra.
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approval, three voting changes' 9 * allegedly within the scope of section 5.
One of these changes concerned a combination of two annexations which
had expanded the city's boundaries in 1966 and 1968 and which were
claimed to have diluted the effectiveness of the black vote. A three-judge
district court, after examining the challenged changes to determine
whether they had a "discriminatory purpose or effect," dissolved a tempo-
rary injunction issued earlier by a single district judge who had relied on
Allen and dismissed the complaint.' 0 On direct appeal the Supreme Court
held'"' that all three changes came within the scope of section 5 and there-
fore should have been submitted to either the District Court for the Dis-
trict of Columbia or the Attorney General for approval prior to implemen-
tation in the 1969 city elections. In reaching its holding with regard to the
annexations, the Court relied primarily upon Fairley v. Patterson,'12 one
of the cases consolidated for appeal in Allen. There the Warren Court had
held that section 5 applied to a change from district to at-large election of
county supervisors on the ground that "[tihe right to vote can be affected
by a dilution of voting power as well as by an absolute prohibition on
casting a ballot."'' 3 Declaring that "[i]n terms of dilution of voting
power, there is no difference between a change from district to at-large
election and an annexation that changes both the boundaries and ward
lines of a city to include more voters,""' the Perkins Court went on to state
two ways in which a revision of boundary lines has an effect on voting:
Clearly, revision of boundary lines has an effect on voting in two ways: (1)
by including certain voters within the city and leaving others outside, it
determines who may vote in the municipal election and who may not; (2) it
dilutes the weight of the votes of the voters to whom the franchise was limited
before the annexation. . . . Moreover, § 5 was designed to cover changes
159. As filed, the complaint originally attacked enforcement with respect to voting of (1)
changes in locations of polling places and (2) changes in the municipal boundaries of the city
by annexations in 1966 and 1968. By leave of the court, the complainants were permitted to
add a third count attacking an alleged change from a ward system to an at-large system of
conducting councilmanic elections. Perkins v. Matthews, 301 F. Supp. 565, 566 (S.D. Miss.
1969).
160. Perkins v. Matthews, 301 F. Supp. 565 (S.D. Miss. 1969).
161. The Court first held that "[tihe three judge court [had] misconceived the permissi-
ble scope of its inquiry into Appellants' allegations." 400 U.S. at 383.
162. 393 U.S. 544 (1969). Besides this judicial precedent, the Perkins Court also found
support for bringing annexations under section 5 in the findings of a study by the United
States Civil Rights Commission that "gerrymandering and boundary changes had become
prime weapons for discriminating against Negro voters" since 1965 and in testimony by
Justice Department officials representing the Attorney General during congressional hearings
in 1969 on the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970. 400 U.S. at 389-94.
163. Fairley v. Patterson, 393 U.S. 544, 569 (1969).
164. Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379, 390 (1971).
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having a potential for racial discrimination in voting, and such potential
inheres in a change in the composition of the electorate affected by an annex-
ation.'6
Although the Court had addressed the coverage issue exclusively, its
emphasis on potential for illegality implied that, while all annexations will
by definition be dilutive, some may be held to be racially discriminatory
while others may not. It remained for the District Court for the District of
Columbia, in actions for declaratory judgment brought by cities under
section 5, and the Attorney General, in passing upon submissions for ad-
ministrative preclearance, to determine whether a given annexation was
discriminatory in purpose or effect in addition to being dilutive per se.
B. QUESTIONS OF SUBSTANTIVE DISCRIMINATION: PURPOSE INQUIRY AND
EFFECT INQUIRY UNDER SECTION 5
To date, the District Court for the District of Columbia has had only two
opportunities to pass upon the merits of annexations submitted by munici-
palities for declaratory judgment under section 5.166 In an appeal from the
more recent of these two cases,"6 7 the Supreme Court for the first time
rendered a decision concerning the purposes and effects of an annexation
submitted for judicial review. While both cases involved Virginia
annexations, their significance will be felt throughout all jurisdictions cov-
ered' 16 under the Voting Rights Act.'
1. The Facts Presented
In City of Petersburg v. United States,"' the district court denied Peters-
165. Id. at 388.
166. City of Richmond v. United States, 376 F. Supp. 1344 (D.D.C. 1974), vacated and
remanded, 422 U.S. 358 (1975); City of Petersburg v. United States, 354 F. Supp. 1021
(D.D.C. 1972), aff'd mem., 410 U.S. 962 (1973). Federal review of municipal annexations
under section 5 has been conducted almost exclusively by the Attorney General. From 1965
to 1974, a total of 1025 annexations were submitted to and reviewed by the Department of
Justice. Only 11 of these annexations had been submitted prior to the Supreme Court's
decision in Perkins in 1971. 7 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1458, 1467 (Aug. 25, 1975).
167. City of Richmond v. United States, 422 U.S. 358 (1975).
168. See note 131 supra and accompanying text.
169. The Attorney General is obligated to follow the decisions of the District Court for the
District of Columbia as well as those of the Supreme Court in passing upon submissions for
preclearance. 28 C.F.R. § 51.19 (1975). In view of the volume of annexations submitted to
the Attorney General, it is clear that any decisions by these courts are likely to have lasting
impressions. See notes 143-46 & 166 supra and accompanying text.
170. 354 F. Supp. 1021 (D.D.C. 1972), aff'd mem., 410 U.S. 962 (1973).
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burg declaratory relief concerning an annexation in 1971 of approximately
14 square miles of neighboring Prince George and Dinwiddie Counties.",
Before the annexation, Petersburg covered an eight-square-mile area in-
habited in 1970 by a population of 36,103. Annexation brought 7,323 new
residents into the city. Racial proportions of overall population were al-
most completely inverted as a result of the annexation. Overnight,
Petersburg changed from a predominantly black city (55% black, 45%
white) to a predominantly white city (54% white, 46% black). Whereas
blacks had held an estimated 51% majority among registered voters in the
city in 1970, almost all of the residents in the annexed area were white,
causing an estimated 4,800 additional white voters to be included in the
city in 1972.72
Declaratory relief also was denied in City of Richmond v. United
States7' in which Richmond had sought approval of an annexation in 1969
of approximately 23 square miles of adjacent Chesterfield County.'74 The
171. Petersburg City Council had adopted Ordinance No. 6064 on October 18, 1966 in order
to initiate formal annexation proceedings in the Circuit Court for Prince George County. The
city's petition for annexation was filed shortly thereafter and a three-judge annexation court
was convened. The annexation court divided 2-1 in approving annexation. The majority and
dissenting opinions were rendered from the bench on October 23 and November 11, 1970,
respectively, with the final decree being entered on March 29, 1971. Writs of error were denied
the counties by the Virginia Supreme Court on November 23, 1971, and the annexation
became effective under state law on January 1, 1972. Files of the Department of Justice, Civil
Rights Division, 550 11th Street N.W., Washington, D.C. 20530. The city filed its action for
declaratory judgment in the district court on March 17, 1972 after the Attorney General had
interposed an objection (dated February 22, 1972) to enforcement of the annexation with
respect to voting in response to the city's formal submission for preclearance (dated December
21, 1971). City of Petersburg v. United States, 354 F. Supp. 1021, 1022-23 (D.D.C. 1972).
172. City of Petersburg v. United States, 354 F. Supp. 1021, 1024 (D.D.C. 1972).
173. 376 F. Supp. 1344 (D.D.C. 1974), vacated and remanded, 422 U.S. 358 (1975).
174. For a discussion of an earlier challenge to the Richmond annexation on fifteenth
amendment grounds in Holt I see notes 108-17 supra and accompanying text.
While litigating Holt I, the city was also occupied with seeking preclearance from the
Justice Department. One week after the Supreme Court had decided Perkins, City Attorney
Conard B. Mattox, Jr. inquired of the Attorney General whether that decision would be
treated as operating retroactively concerning the Richmond annexation. The annexation had
become final under state law when the Supreme Court had denied certiorari to annexed-area
citizens in Deerbourne Civic and Recreation Ass'n v. City of Richmond, 210 Va. li, cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 1038 (1970). Following the Justice Department's response that Perkins would
have such effect, Mattox made the city's first official submission for preclearance on March
8, 1971. Acting Assistant Attorney General David L. Norman interposed an objection on May
7, 1971 on the grounds that "[iun the circumstances of Richmond, where representatives are
elected at large, substantially increasing the number of eligible white voters inevitably tends
to dilute the voting strength of black voters." Relying on Chavis v. Whitcomb, 305 F. Supp.
1364 (S.D. Ind. 1969) (invalidating multimember districting provisions of statewide legisla-
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annexation resulted in an increase from the 1970 population of 202,359
within the boundaries of the old city to a post-annexation population of
249,621. As in Petersburg, the annexed area was inhabited predominantly
by whites, only 1,557 (approximately 3%) of the 47,262 inhabitants of the
annexed area being black. Blacks comprised a 42% population minority in
the post-annexation community whereas the 1970 Census revealed that
they would have had a 52% majority in the old city.'75
The Richmond litigation was unique in that the city had held at-large
councilmanic elections within the enlarged community on June 10, 1970,
without having secured prior federal approval under section 5. " Due to the
retroactive effect given by the Supreme Court to its decision in Perkins,'
these elections were prima facie illegal under the Act.' This factor, and
the submission of a compromise ward election plan by both parties before
trial,' made Richmond considerably more complex' than Petersburg.
tive reapportionment), Norman advised that "[y]ou may, of course, wish to consider means
of accomplishing annexation which would avoid producing an impermissible adverse racial
impact on voting, including such techniques as single-member districts." Following the Su-
preme Court's reversal of the lower court in Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124 (1971), on June
7, 1971, Mattox requested reconsideration (letter dated August 2, 1971) of the city's initial
submission. A legal memorandum signed by Lewis F. Powell, Jr., then a practicing attorney
in Richmond, was attached. On September 30, 1971, Norman reiterated the Justice
Department's objection, stating with reference to the Supreme Court's reversal of the Chavis
decision, ". . . we do not believe that opinion is dispositive of issues raised by the Richmond
annexation."
Mattox submitted a final request for reconsideration on July 5, 1972, in light of the Fourth
Circuit's decision in Holt I, and the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari on June 26, 1972.
Holt v. City of Richmond, 459 F.2d 1095 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 931 (1972). On
August 25, 1972, shortly before the sixty-day period had elapsed on this third request for
preclearance, the city instituted this action in the district court. Curtis Holt, Sr. and the
Crusade for Voters, a Richmond black civic association, were granted leave to intervene as
parties defendant. City of Richmond v. United States, 376 F. Supp. 1344, 1349 n.23 (D.D.C.
1974); Joint Appendix, vol. I at 20-34, 168-69, City of Richmond v. United States, 422 U.S.
358 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Joint Appendix].
175. City of Richmond v. United States, 376 F. Supp. 1344, 1350-51 (D.D.C. 1974).
176. Id. at 1351.
177. 400 U.S. 379, 395 (1971). Justice Brennan's majority opinion in Perkins stated that
the reasoning behind the prospective effect given to Allen in 1969 could not be applied in
Perkins two years later. Compare id. with Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 572
(1969).
178. 376 F. Supp. at 1358; 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1970) (section 5). The city has consistently
argued that its failure to submit the annexation for federal approval until Perkins had been
decided, having held the 1970 councilmanic elections during the interim, was reasonable,
particularly in light of the subsequent nonunanimous decision by the Supreme Court in
Perkins. Appellant's Reply Memorandum at 8, City of Richmond v. United States, 422 U.S.
358 (1975). See the dissenting opinions of Justices Harlan and Black in Perkins.
179. Following the district court's decision in Petersburg on October 24, 1972, the city
entered into negotiations with the Attorney General for the purpose of arriving at a compro-
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2. Purpose Inquiry
In Petersburg, the district court concluded that "the annexation as car-
ried out was fairly intended to accomplish a legitimate governmental pur-
pose. The city limits were expanded into those areas which were most
reasonably available and which were the most desirable for accomplishing
the legitimate purposes of annexation."' 8 ' The court also found that annex-
ation had been necessary to allow the city to achieve healthy economic
growth and that the annexed territory shared a community of interests
with the city. The contours of the annexation had been designed without
racial animus and. the record demonstrated that annexation had generally
received biracial support.' 2
Richmond presented an entirely different setting for purpose inquiry
under section 5. The district court held that while the city had been moti-
vated at the beginning of the Chesterfield annexation suit by legitimate
goals of urban expansion,'1 by 1969 the city had become motivated by a
discriminatory purpose to forestall a black political "takeover" in the 1970
councilmanic elections by annexing as many white residents in
Chesterfield as possible.'8 4 Having made these findings, the court
mise ward plan as an alternative to the traditional at-large election system. By April 25, 1973,
the parties had reached agreement on a nine-ward, single-member district plan which was
believed to have satisfactorily remedied the discriminatory effect of the 1969 annexation. On
May 1, 1973, Richmond city council adopted the proposed plan which was then submitted
to the district court in the form of a motion to consider consent judgment on May 17, 1973.
Joint Appendix, vol. I at 150-54. The intervenors entered objections to the plan before the
court on May 30, 1973. Id. at 6.
180. Appointment of a Master and stipulation by all of the parties to the record in Holt I,
however, assisted the district court in its fact-finding chores. 376 F. Supp. at 1346, 1349.
181. City of Petersburg v. United States, 354 F. Supp. 1021, 1024 (D.D.C. 1972).
182. Id.
183. City of Richmond v. United States, 376 F. Supp. 1344, 1351 (D.D.C. 1974).
184. Id. at 1349-50, citing Master's Finding of Facts, Nos. 4, 5, 6, 7 & 9.
The court rejected the city's estoppel argument that the Fourth Circuit's reversal in Holt I
precluded a holding in the instant action brought under section 5 that Richmond had failed
to carry its burden of proof in purpose inquiry. Id. at 1352 n.43. Emphasizing the difference
between the private fifteenth amendment suit involved in Holt I and an action for declaratory
judgment brought by a jurisdiction covered under section 5, the court noted that the Fourth
Circuit itself had realized that no such effect should attach to its decision. Id., citing Holt v.
City of Richmond, 459 F.2d 1093, 1100 (4th Cir. 1972).
The city devoted a substantial portion of its brief on appeal in an attempt to persuade the
Supreme Court that the question of purpose had been finally settled by the Fourth Circuit
in Holt L Brief for the Appellant at 22-32, City of Richmond v. United States, 422 U.S. 358
(1975) [hereinafter cited as Brief for the Appellant]. In their brief, the United States and
the Attorney General opposed the city's estoppel argument on three grounds. The first two
paralleled the district court's reasoning that "causes of action arising under the Fifteenth
Amendment and the Voting Rights Act [are] separate and distinct . . ." and that the
1976]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
"address[ed] . . . the importance of Richmond's failure to prove, as Pe-
tersburg did, that its annexation did not have a discriminatory purpose."'
'
After disapproving the diametrically-opposed views of both the master' 6
and the city' 7 on this issue, the court formulated its own dual standard
for determining whether the city had purged itself of discriminatory taint
by adopting the proposed ward election plan. In order to obtain declaratory
relief, the city would have to demonstrate "by substantial evidence (1) that
the ward plan not only reduced, but also effectively eliminated, the dilu-
tion of black voting power caused by the annexation, and (2) that the city
has some objectively verifiable, legitimate purpose for annexation."'' 8
In applying the "objectively verifiable, legitimate purpose" test estab-
lished for purpose inquiry in Richmond, the district court gave controlling
weight to testimony offered at trial by opponents of the annexation' 9 in-
resulting difference in the incidence of proof should preclude application of the doctrine of
collateral estoppel. Brief for the Federal Parties at 16 n. 4, City of Richmond v. United States,
422 U.S. 358 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Brief for the Federal Parties], citing One Lot
Emerald Cut Stones v. United States, 409 U.S. 232, 235 (1972). In rejecting the city's estoppel
argument, however, the Supreme Court relied solely upon the fact that the federal parties
had not participated in the Holt I litigation, which had been their third ground for objection.
City of Richmond v. United States, 422 U.S. 358, 373 n.6 (1975); Brief for the Federal Parties
at 16-17 n.4, citing Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation,
402 U.S. 313, 329 (1971). See generally Note, Collateral Estoppel of Nonparties, 87 HARV. L.
REV. 1485 (1974).
No problem of collateral estoppel could arise concerning purpose or effect from a suit
brought by a private litigant in the local district court for nonsubmission of a covered change
in voting since the court's jurisdiction would enable it to reach only the question of coverage.
But what if the Attorney General is joined in a private fifteenth amendment suit in the local
district court which ultimately fails? Whether such a result would entitle the covered jurisdic-
tion to declaratory relief in a subsequent suit brought pursuant to section 5 was left unan-
swered when the Supreme Court found nonparticipation controlling in Richmond.
185. 376 F. Supp. at 1353.
186. The Master had recommended deannexation on the grounds that once the city was
proven to have had an illegal purpose in annexing territory as a means of diluting black voting
strength, it "could never prove that it no longer had such a discriminatory purpose in retain-
ing the annexed area after adoption of a single-member district ward plan." Id.
187. The court's understanding of the city's argument was that evidence of "some effort
to remove the discriminatory effect of an annexation by adoption of a ward plan [would be]
sufficieilt to prove that it does not retain the annexed voters for a discriminatory purpose."
Id.
188. Id. The second aspect of this dual standard was concerned with legitimate purposes
for retaining the annexed area. See 376 F. Supp. at 1353-54 & n.52.
189. See 376 F. Supp. at 1353-54. The Master had heard testimony at trial from the County
Administrator of Chesterfield County that only 6.25% of the total land in the annexed area
(not of the vacant land, as stated in the district court's opinion) was capable of industrial
development while, on the other hand, deannexation would save the city money by resulting
in short-term annual savings of an estimated $8.5 million in net operating losses and long-
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stead of to evidentiary references to the record and decisions in Holt I upon
which the city had relied. 9 ' With this view of the evidence, the district
court concluded that the city had failed to establish any counterbalancing
economic or administrative benefits of the annexation.' If indeed the
court was requiring proof establishing benign purposes for retaining the
particular 1969 compromise annexation,' 2 the city's reliance upon the
dated record from Holt I would not have been responsive. Whether the city
had been fully apprised of the nature of its burden on this issue at trial is
unclear from a reading of the court's opinion.
On appeal, the Supreme Court was asked to pass upon the propriety of
requiring proof of legitimate reasons for retaining 3 the annexed area by a
showing of "counterbalancing economic or administrative benefits"'9 in
order to save an annexation infected with a discriminatory purpose. Look-
ing to Petersburg for support, the city argued' 5 that these aspects of the
annexation should not have been before the district court for review.'96
Justice White, speaking for a 5-3 majority,'9 7 disagreed, holding that the
court below had properly interposed this extra burden'8 of proof in purpose
term savings of $21.3 million of additional capital outlay, as required by the annexation court
decree. Joint Appendix, vol. II at 510-34.
190. See 376 F. Supp. at 1354. Noting that the city had offered no testimony at trial
relevant to this issue, the district court made only two references to the record and the lower
court's decision in Holt I in its brief discussion of the city's position after trial on this issue.
191. Id. at 1353, citing Master's Conclusions of Laws, No. 17.
192. See id. at 1354 n.52.
193. See note 188 supra.
194. 376 F. Supp. at 1353.
195. Both the federal parties and the intervenors agreed that the district court had been
correct in requiring proof of current legitimate reasons for retaining the annexed area in order
for the city to establish that its invidious purpose had been purged. See Brief for the Federal
Parties at 32; Brief for the Appellee Holt at 24, City of Richmond v. United States, 422 U.S.
358 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Brief for the Appellee Holt]; Brief for the Appellee Crusade
for Voters at 10, City of Richmond v. United States, 422 U.S. 358 (1975). However, the
intervenors favored deannexation since they argued that the city could not meet this burden
of proof. For the Attorney General's argument to the contrary see note 203 infra.
196. Brief for the Appellant at 51-53. The Petersburg court had held that "this annexation,
insofar as it is a mere boundary change and not an expansion of an at-large system, is not
the kind of discriminatory change which Congress sought to prevent." City of Petersburg v.
United States, 354 F. Supp. 1021, 1031 (D.D.C. 1972). Petersburg cannot be cited for this
proposition with confidence, however, where, as in Richmond, a city acts with a racial
purpose. The city's argument erroneously posited that if adverse effect upon black voting
strength had been cured within the meaning of section 5, any invidious purpose borne by the
annexation's original proponents should be disregarded.
197. Justice Powell did not participate. See note 174 supra. Justice Brennan wrote a dis-
senting opinion in which Justices Douglas and Marshall joined.
198. See section IV. C. infra for a discussion contra the city's view that the district court
had imposed an "extra burden" upon the city, but instead had given it a second chance to
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
inquiry as a condition to declaratory relief. Accepting the findings of the
district court that the annexation as conceived in 1969 displayed an imper-
missible purpose,0 0 the Court ratified this second aspect of the district
court's dual standard for determining whether racial purpose had been
purged by holding "that if verifiable reasons are now demonstrable in
support of the annexation, and the ward plan proposed is fairly designed,
the city need do no more to satisfy the requirements of § 5."'00 However,
the Supreme Court was not satisfied that the master and the court below
had made sufficiently informed and considered conclusions from all of the
evidence that may have related to this issue.2 °0 Since "the controlling fac-
tor in this case [was] whether there [were then] objectively verifiable,
legitimate reasons for the annexation . "..112 and since the United States
had recommended further findings concerning "nondiscriminatory pur-
poses that might justify retention of the annexed area, 20 3 the Court de-
cided to remand the case for further evidentiary proceedings on this
issue. 2114
obtain a declaratory judgment by showing that its original racial purpose had been purged.
199. 422 U.S. at 373 & n.6. See note 184 supra.
200. 422 U.S. at 374. Although "now" may be susceptible of several interpretations in this
context, it is quite clear that the Court was speaking in terms of legitimate evidence, currently
demonstrable, for the city to retain the area which it annexed in 1969. In explaining the
necessity for remand, the Court stated that it had "sufficient doubt that the record is com-
plete and up to date with respect to whether there are now justifiable reasons for the city to
retain the annexed area that we believe further proceedings with respect to this question are
desirable." Id. at 378 (emphasis added).
201. Id. at 377-78. See notes 189-92 supra and accompanying text. The majority pointed
to the lack of discussion of evidence tending to support the city and the Master's apparent
sole reliance upon the testimony of an interested witness in the County Administrator of
Chesterfield County as factors necessitating a remand. In light of the city's objection to the
imposition of this burden of proof in the lower court after trial, the Court was also concerned
that the record here was incomplete. Id. at 378.
202. Id. at 375.
203. Id. at 373 n.6, citing Brief for the Federal Parties at 34-35. The Attorney General made
quite clear, however, that in his judgment the city could in fact meet this test upon remand:
The City has objectively verifiable, legitimate reasons for retaining the annexed area.
Although the timing of the conclusion of the annexation agreement apparently was
motivated by impermissible racial considerations, the annexation itself was principally
motivated by legitimate goals of urban expansion, in particular by a need to broaden
the City's tax base in view of the high public welfare expenditures required by the
growing low-income population within the preannexation boundaries. The costs of
administering the newly annexed area will be significantly less than the revenues that
area will produce. Furthermore, the annexation has enabled the City to maintain
racially integrated schools. Brief for the Federal Parties at 13-14.
204. The dissent complained that the majority had manipulated the standard of review
under FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a) by failing to accept the district court's findings on this issue
without actually declaring them to have been "clearly erroneous." 422 U.S. at 384-85.
[Vol. 10:557
ANNEXATION IN VIRGINIA
3. Effect Inquiry
From the outset, the district court in Petersburg was aware that, while
any annexation would by definition be dilutive, a given annexation may
still satisfy effect scrutiny under section 5 if it is shown not to have resulted
in a discriminatory dilution of black voting strength (i.e., that it did not
realize its potential for racial discrimination) .2o In order to detect whether
the Petersburg annexation had worked such an effect, the court studied the
factual context in which it had occurred as the means of measuring its
probable impact on black voting strength. The court held that, within the
context of past de jure discrimination, 06 past racial bloc-voting, 21 a pre-
dominantly white annexed area,'2 and expansion of an at-large system of
electing councilmen, ' the annexation had in fact resulted in a discrimina-
tory dilution of black voting strength and therefore could not be approved
as submitted.2 10
The court was not willing to hold, however, that Petersburg's annexation
could not be squared with section 5 under any circumstances. Agreeing
with the Assistant Attorney General in his letter of objection,'2 1 the court
held that, since it was not the annexation per se but the annexation in the
context of at-large elections and bloc-voting which had diluted black vot-
ing strength,2 1 2 the proscribed effect could be avoided if the city adopted a
system of single-member wards213 "calculated to neutralize to the extent
possible any adverse effect upon the political participation of black voters
205. See concluding remarks in section IV. A. supra. The Petersburg court framed this
issue quite clearly when it stated, "[t]he simple transformation of a potential black voting
majority into a clear minority has no effect on relative racial voting strengths unless votes
are cast along racial lines." City of Petersburg v. United States, 354 F. Supp. 1021, 1025
(D.D.C. 1972) (emphasis added). The court was referring to racial bloc-voting, one of the most
important factors giving rise to the discriminatory dilution in that annexation.
206. 354 F. Supp. at 1025.
207. Id. at 1025-27 & n.10.
208. Id. at 1024.
209. Id. at 1025, 1027 & 1029.
210. Id. at 1028-29.
211. Id. at 1022-23 n.2. The Department of Justice had consistently emphasized the factual
context within which the annexation had occurred as the determinative factor. See also id.
at 1031.
212. Id. at 1029.
213. Of course, the city was powerless to modify other aspects of the context of the annexa-
tion such as past statewide de jure discrimination and, even more importantly, its vestige as
a social problem in the form of racial bloc-voting. Although the annexed area was inhabited
predominantly by white residents, the court had found that the city-had no viable alternative
in determining in which direction to expand. Thus, only with respect to the at-large system
of councilmanic elections did the city have the ability to modify the factual context of its
annexation.
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... .," In so holding, the district court rejected the argument of inter-
venors that its sole jurisdiction under section 5 was limited to issuing a
declaratory judgment either for or against the city and that the court had
improperly resorted to its general equitable jurisdiction in considering the
context in which the annexation had occurred and any means by which it
could be "modified" so as to merit judicial approval.215 Refusing to ac-
knowledge resort to its "broad equity power," the court dismissed this
argument by responding that since its declaratory judgment against the
city was the product of the discriminatory expansion of an at-large voting
system, its jurisdiction under section 5 to render such a holding would
necessarily also extend to deciding what the city might do to amend its
annexation so as to gain a favorable judgment.' 6
In Richmond, the district court perceived a need for a more rigorous
burden of proof in effect inquiry where purpose inquiry had disclosed a
mindful intent to discriminate against blacks by annexing suburban terri-
tory with the objective of diluting black voting strength. Distinguishing
Petersburg,21 the court required the city to establish that the proposed
ward plan would have "not only reduced, but also effectively eliminated,
the dilution2 11 of black voting power caused by the annexation ... "I,,
This was a test that Richmond could never meet. In order to give blacks
the same voting strength under a ward system in the enlarged community
214. 354 F. Supp. at 1031. The court's inclusion of the words "to the extent possible" may
be directly attributable to its preoccupation with the argument by intervenors that switching
to a ward system in councilmanic elections could have no ameliorative effect upon the dilu-
tion of black votes in the at-large election of six "constitutional" officers. See id. at 1029-31;
VA. CONST. art. VII, § 4. See also VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-40.1 (Repl. Vol. 1973). However, both
the district court and the Supreme Court in Richmond subsequently applied this language
as a quantitative requisite with which to judge the acceptability of the city's proposed nine-
ward, single-member district plan.
215. 354 F. Supp. at 1029.
216. Id.
It has been suggested by distinguished scholars that there may be a difference between
suit for a declaration about the legal consequences of past conduct and a suit in which
a declaration is sought about the legal consequences of future conduct. The latter
situation, it is said, is 'doubly contingent,' since the future conduct may not take place
and if it does the other party may not challenge it.. . . The courts have not used the
language of single or double contingency and they have issued declaratory judgments
about the legal consequences of future conduct. C.A. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW
OF FEDERAL COURTS 447-48 (2d ed. 1970).
217. City of Richmond v. United States, 376 F. Supp. 1344, 1353 & n.46 (D.D.C. 1974).
218. Although the court did not dwell upon them, the same four factors that had been held
to render the annexation. in Petersburg discriminatory in effect were found to be present in
Richmond also. See 376 F. Supp. at 1349, 1351-52. See also notes 206-09 supra and accompa-
nying text.
219. 376 F. Supp. at 1353.
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that they would presently have under an at-large system absent annexa-
tion, the city would have had to stretch the fourteenth amendment reap-
portionment cases beyond acceptable population variance tolerances.2 0
After reviewing the city's plan, 2' the district court arrived at the inevitable
conclusion that Richmond had in fact failed to meet the "effectively elimi-
nate" standard.
The district court also disapproved the annexation as modified by the
proposed ward plan under the "calculated to neutralize to the extent possi-
ble" standard established in Petersburg. The court endorsed the findings
of the master that the city had not considered racial living patterns in
drafting its ward plan in an effort to affirmatively reduce to the extent
220. See generally Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1 (1975); White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755
(1973); Gaffney v. Commings, 412 U.S. 735 (1973); Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315 (1973);
Abate v. Mundt, 403 U.S. 182 (1971); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
In Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968), the Supreme Court had held that the
"one man-one vote" principle of Reynolds v. Sims and its progeny applied to local govern-
ments. Since there were simply not enough blacks of voting age in the new community to
give them a majority in enough wards to be able to control city council, the city could have
"effectively eliminated" dilution of black voting strength only by creating excessive variances
in population between over-populated white wards and under-populated black wards, in
violation of the fourteenth amendment.
221. 376 F. Supp. at 1355-56. The nine-ward, single-member district plan submitted to the
court for approval by the city and the Attorney General displayed the following demographic
characteristics, based on 1970 Census statistics.
Predominantly White Wards
Total Non-Black Black
Ward Population Population % Population %
A 27,085 26,556 98.0 529 2.0
B 26,442 22,190 83.9 4,252 16.1
D 28,864 28,525 98.8 339 1.2
I 27,907 26,506 95.0 1,401 5.0
Predominantly Black Wards
Total Non-Black Black
Ward Population Population % Population %
C 27,117 7,149 26.4 19,968 73.6
E 26,803 9,476 35.4 17,327 64.6
F 28,990 3,227 11.1 25,763 88.9
G 27,124 3,832 14.1 23,292 85.9
A ninth ward, Ward H, was the so-called "swing" ward. It had a total population of 29,099
(17,204 non-black, 11,895 black) and was 59.1% non-black and 40.9% black. The median
population among all nine wards was 27,715. Maximum over-representation was 4.6% (Ward
B) while maximum under-representation was 5% (Ward H). Plaintiff's Exhibit
18-Demographic Characteristics, accompanying Exhibit 15, Joint Appendix, vol. I at 162.
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possible the discriminatory dilution of the black vote.' The court found
further evidence of the city's failure to meet the Petersburg standard in
comparing the city's plan with an alternative plan drafted by the inter-
venor Crusade for Voters. Since the Crusade plan223 had a "swing" ward
with a 59% black population majority rather than the 41% black minority
displayed by the city's plan, the court inferred that "the city could have
done more to compensate for the dilution of black voting power caused by
the annexation. 2 2 4
222. Both in Petersburg and in Richmond the district court subordinated the principle of
racial color-blindness when faced with the problem of how the discriminatory effects of
annexation could be cured. See notes 248-52 infra and accompanying text. In Richmond, the
district court noted the city's consideration of such pertinent factors as minimal variance
from population equality, compactness, physical boundaries, and likeness of area, but went
on to hold that "[w]hile Richmond could have legitimately taken these factors into account,
they should have been accommodated to the goal of minimizing dilution of the black vote."
376 F. Supp. at 1357.
223. See id. The nine-ward, single-member district plan proposed by the intervenor Cru-
sade for Voters displayed the following demographic characteristics, based on 1970 Census
statistics, subject to "two minor errors" which had not been corrected by the time of the trial.
Predominantly White Wards
Total Non-Black Black
Ward Population Population % Population %
A 27,714 25,257 91.13 2.457 8.87
B 28,190 27,928 99.07 262 .93
D 27,730 27,105 97.75 625 2.25
I 27,606 26,301 95.27 1,305 4.73
Predominantly Black Wards
Total Non-Black Black
Ward Population Population % Population %
C 27,979 10,100 36.10 17,879 63.90
E 27,712 7,538 27.20 20,174 72.80
F 27,460 4,956 18.05 22,504 81.95
G 27,226 3,820 14.03 23,406 85.97
Ward H once again was the "swing" ward. It had a total population of 27.861 (11,417 non-
black, 16,444 black) and was 40.98% non-black and 59.02% black. Crusade for Voters Exhibit
21 - Plan R (Map V), Joint Appendix, vol. I at 165.
These population figures would indicate that the median population among all nine wards
was 27,720. Maximum over-representation would then be 1.8% (Ward G) while maximum
under-representation would be 1.7% (Ward B). Based upon these calculations, it may be
submitted that the Crusade's plan (maximum deviation = 3.48%) was also an improvement
over the city's plan (maximum deviation = 9.58%) in another regard - it more nearly
achieved the ideal of mathematical equality as an apportionment device.
224. 376 F. Supp. at 1357.
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On appeal, the Supreme Court was presented with two different stan-
dards as devised by the district court in Petersburg and Richmond which
it could have applied in determining whether discriminatory dilution of
black voting strength had been cured within the meaning of section 5.
Justice White began his opinion by disapproving the district court's inter-
pretation of Perkins with regard to the effect of annexations on minority
voting power2  by noting that "[w]e did not hold in Perkins that every
annexation effecting a reduction in the percentage of Negroes in the city's
population is prohibited by § 5."'2 The Court rejected the extraordinary
"effectively eliminate" standard for annexations displaying both
discriminatory purpose and effect because it believed that Congress could
not have intended the extremes of either forbidding all such annexations
or, as a condition to declaratory relief, overrepresentation of blacks to the
detriment of other elements in the enlarged community.22
Refusing to adopt the "effectively eliminate" standard,2 2 1 the Court was
225. The district court had asserted that Perkins left implicit the obvious:
If the proportion of blacks in the new citizenry from the annexed area is appreciably
less than the proportion of blacks living within the city's old boundaries, and particu-
larly if there is a history of racial bloc voting in the city, the voting power of black
citizens as a class is diluted and thus abridged. 376 F. Supp. at 1348.
226. City of Richmond v. United States, 422 U.S. 358, 368 (1975).
227. Id. at 371. See note 220 supra and accompanying text. Although the Court did not
cite any of its decisions in the reapportionment cases, it is clear that it had refused to sacrifice
the fourteenth amendment to the district court's "effectively eliminate" standard.
228. The Court also declined approval of the district court's argument that failure to sat-
isfv the "effectively eliminate" standard was further evidence of invidious purpose on the
part of the city. The district court had condemned the city's motive for adopting the com-
promise ward plan at a time when "the present black population majority within Rich-
mond's old boundaries [would] translate in a few years into a voting-age majority." 376 F.
Supp. at 1355. In fact, statistical evidence supports a view contrary from that taken by the
district court. At trial the Attorney General offered uncontroverted census statistics from
the boundaries of the old city for 1950, 1960 and 1970, proving that the black percentage of
the voting-age population had consistently lagged behind that of the total population by
1.9%, 4.2% and 7.2%, respectively. For example, the 1970 Census indicates that, within the
old city, the black percentage (44.8%) of the voting-age population lagged behind the black
percentage (52%) of the total population by 7.2%. Brief for the Appellant at 44. While this
phenomenon may be attributed to a number of factors (e.g., black migration, higher birth
rates and shorter life expectancies), Richmond appears to be no exception to a generally
observable trend in this respect throughout cities in the United States. Interview with Sidney
R. Bixler, Civil Rights Division, Department of Justice, in Washington, D.C., October 26,
1975. Although other factors such as white flight could be expected to contribute to the
emergence of an eventual black voting-age majority within the pre-annexation community,
this evidence tended to prove that the "translation" process would be considerably less rapid
than the court indicated. As was stated by the federal parties in their brief:
No demographic projections were introduced to show when, if ever, a 52 percent black
population majority might be transformed into a black voting-age majority; certainly
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prepared to endorse the "calculated to neutralize to the extent possible"
standard established in Petersburg. However, the question arises whether
the Court altered that standard while professing to restate it in Richmond.
The Court held that "[a]s long as the ward system fairly reflects the
strength of the Negro community as it exists after the annexation, we
cannot hold, without more specific legislative directions, that such an
annexation is nevertheless barred by § 5."1" Since the city's proposed ward
plan "[did] not undervalue the black strength in the community after
annexation," ' it was viewed as having sufficiently compensated for the
discriminatory effect of the annexation which had resulted within the con-
text of the at-large system. The dissent noted, however, that "[t]he reli-
ance upon postannexation fairness of representation is inconsistent with
• . . the fundamental objective of § 5, namely the protection of present
levels of voting effectiveness for the black population. '2 3'
It is clear that there is more than a semantic difference between the
Petersburg standard which requires mitigation of discriminatory dilution
of minority voting strength to the extent possible and the Supreme Court's
standard for effect inquiry. 2 While Petersburg focused upon achieving
maximum reversal of dilution of black voting strength as it existed in the
old city, the Supreme Court in Richmond apparently looked beyond the
discriminatory dilution merely to ascertain whether blacks would be fairly
represented in the post-annexation, predominantly white community.
That the city should have been required to do more, particularly upon
these facts, than simply provide for adequate representation of blacks in
the enlarged community is a normative function of Congress' purpose in
enacting section 5.3 That the city could have done more to mitigate the
dilutive effect of the 1969 annexation is evident in view of the Crusade's
it is not inconceivable that net out-migrations of young blacks, or net in-migrations of
older whites, could result in an indefinitely prolonged period during which whites
retained majority voting power. Brief for the Federal Parties at 25.
229. 422 U.S. at 371.
230. Id. at 372.
231. Id. at 388 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
232. See the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Brennan where he refers to the test applied
by the majority as "the narrowed Petersburg 'effect' test." 422 U.S. at 389 n.18 (Brennan,
J., dissenting).
233. Having become suspicious of any change in election practices or procedures in certain
portions of the nation from experience, Congress enacted section 5 as a prophylactic method
of enforcing the Voting Rights Act. See generally Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S.
544, 556, 565-66 (1969); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308-15, 328, 335 (1966);
Beer v. United States, 374 F. Supp. 363, 377-81 (D.D.C. 1974). Covered jurisdictions should
not be able to circumvent the Act by accomplishing "post-dilution" fairness of representation
of their black minorities.
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alternative ward plan which would have given blacks a better opportunity
to elect a majority of city council representatives responsive to their inter-
ests."'
C. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE SUPREME CouRT's RECENT DECISION
An understanding of the Supreme Court's decision and an assessment
of its significance for the future depends upon an understanding of the
unique factual situation presented the Court in Richmond. As the dissent
noted,2 the Richmond litigation evidenced a quirk in timing in that the
annexation became effective just over a year before Perkins v. Matthews
was decided. 6 With neither a submission to the Attorney General nor a
challenge in the local district court,27 the annexation went forward in 1970
without preimplementation scrutiny. Thus, in 1975, the Supreme Court
was faced with an annexation proven to have been tainted with an illegal
purpose which had already been implemented as well as enforced with
respect to voting? 8m The issue confronting the Court was whether this an-
nexation, and the election that followed it, should be allowed to stand.
The most difficult question facing the Supreme Court in Richmond was
whether to adopt a literal interpretation of the statute29 or to create an
isolated "municipal hardship" exception regarding section 5 in purpose
234. See notes 222-24 supra and accompanying text.
The district court had appreciated the significance of winning the fifth seat on city council
where a majority of five would control a city split almost in half by racial bloc-voting. It
stated:
We must look beyond percentages, whether they be of total populations or of voting-
age populations, to determine the effect of the boundary expansion on the voting power
of blacks and their access to the political process.
[Ajlthough population is the proper measure of equality in apportionment, in
Whitcomb v. Chavis . . . and White v. Regester . . . the Supreme Court announced
that access to the political process and not population was the barometer of dilution
of minority voting strength. City of Richmond v. United States, 376 F. Supp. 1344,
1355 n.56 (D.D.C. 1974), quoting Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297, 1303 (5th Cir.
1973) (en banc).
235. City of Richmond v. United States, 422 U.S. 358, 384 n.12 (1975) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
236. The annexation became effective on January 1, 1970. Id. at 363. Perkins was not
decided until January 14, 1971. 400 U.S. 379 (1971).
237. Curtis Holt, Sr. filed a private section 5 suit in the local district court on December
9, 1971, seeking to overturn the annexation for lack of prior federal approval. Holt v. City of
Richmond, C.A. No. 695-71-R (E.D. Va. 1971), stay granted, 406 U.S. 903 (1972) (commonly
referred to as Holt II). This challenge came almost two years after implementation of the
annexation and fifteen months after the illegal councilmanic election of 1970.
238. See notes 176-78 supra and accompanying text.
239. See note 138 supra.
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inquiry.24' By establishing the present as the interpretive date for purpose
inquiry upon remand, the Court avoided the inelastic, retroactive ap-
proach which the language of the statute would appear to require. Having
failed to carry its burden of proof in the first instance, the Court was willing
to allow the city a second chance. Perhaps the Court was disposed to
accommodate the city since the discriminatory effect of its annexation was
held to have been "cured."24 ' However, whether there now exist currently
demonstrable, legitimate reasons for retaining the annexed area is not
necessarily determinative of whether the original invidious purpose has
"disappeared." ' In any event, such "post hoc rationalization '2  of an
annexation originally infected with an impermissible purpose is not likely
to be allowed in the future. With the coverage question now well settled
by Perkins, covered jurisdictions that fail to submit an annexation for
federal approval prior to implementation should not receive the generous
treatment afforded Richmond. In addition, tainted annexations that are
submitted for preimplementation scrutiny should not give rise to the pru-
dential considerations against deannexation 244 and overturning elections2 5
which may have persuaded the Richmond Court to give the city a second
chance in purpose inquiry. In this respect, the significance of the Supreme
Court's decision may be limited.246
In contrast, Richmond cannot similarly be limited in its effect inquiry.
The timing of the annexation and the delay between implementation and
submission that presumably gave rise to "post hoc rationalization" in
purpose inquiry only tangentially affected the Court's inquiry into whether
the discriminatory effect had been cured by the city's ward election sys-
tem. Thus, it becomes even more significant that the Court tampered with
240. Cf. 422 U.S. at 388 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
241. See text accompanying notes 228-29 supra.
242. The fact that in Richmond there may be current objective justifications for
annexation provides little proof that the original racial purpose has disappeared. Once
an annexation has been found to have a racial purpose, a court should assume that
this purpose continues, at least in the absence of a significant change in the racial
effect of the annexation or in the identities of its proponents. Especially under a
statutory scheme that mandates suspicion of all changes in electoral practice, a show-
ing of economic and administrative advantage should not suffice to dissipate an infer-
ence of continuing racial motivation. The Supreme Court, 1974 Term, 89 HARV. L. REV.
1, 218 (1975) (footnotes omitted).
243. 422 U.S. at 383 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
244. The Court was not persuaded by intervenor Holt's argument that deannexation would
be an appropriate remedy in the case at bar. See Brief for the Appellee Holt at 37-41.
245. See generally Toney v. White, 488 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1973); Bell v. Southwell, 376 F.2d
659 (5th Cir. 1967); Hamer v. Campbell, 358 F.2d 215 (5th Cir. 1966); James v. Humphreys
County Bd. of Election Comm'rs, 384 F. Supp. 114 (N.D. Miss. 1974).
246. Accord, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term, 89 HARv. L. REV. 1, 219 (1975).
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the Petersburg standard by holding that the adverse effect would be cured
if the ward system fairly reflected black voting strength in the new com-
munity." ' Although the majority cited Petersburg with approval, '48 it was
apparently unwilling to require the limited benign discrimination '49 which
247. See notes 232-34 supra and accompanying text.
248. 422 U.S. at 370.
249. The Court did not squarely discuss the issue of "benign districting" in Richmond, but
may have been impressed with the practical difficulties of such a scheme, such as what
measure of political power should be assigned to the black community and for what length
of time the boundaries should last. See The Supreme Court, 1974 Term, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1,
216 (1975). The issue raises serious questions of constitutionality as well. Taylor v.
McKeithen, 407 U.S. 191, 193-94 (1972) (per curiam) (benign districting in legislative reap-
portionment raises "an important federal question"). Color-conscious remedies for past de
jure discrimination, of course, have been permitted in school desegregation cases. See, e.g.,
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971); Green v. New Kent County
School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968). See generally Leedes & O'Fallon, School Desegregation in
Richmond: A Case History, 10 U. RICH. L. REV. 1 (1975) (history of the Bradley litigation).
They have also found acceptance as a method of combatting the effects of past private
discrimination in employment. See, e.g., Associated Gen. Cont'rs v. Altshuler, 490 F.2d 9 (1st
Cir. 1973); Contractors Ass'n v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F.2d 159 (3d Cir. 1971). See generally
Werne, A Guide to the Law of Fair Employment, 10 U. RicH. L. REV. 209, 256-65 (1976)
(affirmative action programs under Title VII). But preferential treatment of minorities
through benign districting may be dissimilar from other instances of benign discrimination
since the highly-valued right to vote is at stake. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-62
(1964).
The courts have repeatedly adhered to the principle of racial color-blindness when review-
ing legislative districting. Howard v. Adams County Bd. of Supv'rs, 453 F.2d 455 (5th Cir.
1972); Ferrell v. Oklahoma, 339 F. Supp. 73, 83 (W.D. Okla.), aff'd, 406 U.S. 939 (1972);
Kilgarlin v. Martin, 252 F. Supp. 404 (S.D. Tex. 1966), rev'd on other grounds, 386 U.S. 120
(1967); Mann v. Davis, 245 F. Supp. 241, 245 (E.D. Va.), aff'd per curiam sub nom. Burnette
v. Davis, 382 U.S. 42 (1965). See also Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52, 66-67 (1964) (Doug-
las, J., dissenting); United Jewish Orgs., Inc. v. Wilson, 510 F.2d 512, 525-34 (2d Cir. 1974)
(Frankel, J., dissenting). But see contra, United Jewish Orgs., Inc. v. Wilson, 510 F.2d 512
(2d Cir. 1974), cert. granted sub nom. United Jewish Orgs., Inc. v. Carey, 96 S. Ct. 354 (1975).
Another factor that may have prompted the Supreme Court to require only Post-annexation
fairness in Richmond was that there was no long-term history of malapportionment which
benign districting could have been intended to remedy. In both Petersburg and Richmond
the dilution was a recent development, arriving concurrently with annexation. But quaere
whether the presumption of illegality under section 5 when applied to any covered change in
election practices or procedures should not be sufficient to override the absence of past
malapportionment?
For an understanding of benign districting as part of the larger problem of benign discrimi-
nation, see generally Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse Racial Discrimination, 41 U. CHi.
L. REV. 723 (1974); Flaherty & Sheard, DeFunis, The Equal Protection Dilemma: Affirmative
Action and Quotas, 12 DUQUESNE L. REV. 745 (1974); Kaplan, Equal Justice in an Unequal
World: Equality for the Negro-The Problem of Special Treatment, 61 Nw. U.L. REV. 363
(1966); Note, Compensatory Racial Reapportionment, 25 STAN. L. REv. 84 (1972); Comment,
Compensatory Racial Reapportionment But No Right to Community Unity, 9 SuFF. U.L.
REV. 1496 (1975); R. Bourne, De Facto Segregation: The Erosion of Intentionality and the
Limits of Judicial Power 59-69, May 1975 (unpublished master's thesis in Harvard Law
School Library).
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inheres in the Petersburg standard when actually confronted with an ex-
pansion which displayed racial purpose in Richmond. The Court should
have been more willing to permit a city submitting such an annexation to
consider race in drawing ward lines as a condition to declaratory relief.
Since awareness of race under Petersburg is warranted only in order to
neutralize25" dilution, the city would not have been required to overcom-
pensate by conferring substantially disporportionate representation upon
the black minority in the enlarged electorate.2' By substituting its "post-
annexation fairness" standard for the Petersburg test without explanation,
the Court may have decided to postpone a decision concerning benign
discrimination in apportionment until the issue was more directly litigated
in the future . 52
Finally, it is significant to note that the Supreme Court tacitly approved
deannexation as an appropriate remedy if on remand the city failed to
carry its burden of establishing legitimate reasons for retaining the an-
nexed area. Although an earlier decision 2 by another three-judge panel
had limited its jurisdiction solely to rendering a declaratory judgment,
both the district court 254 and, apparently, the Supreme Court15 in
Richmond were convinced that complete relief could be granted.2" In that
250. Neutralizing dilution to the extent possible does not include going beyond the dilution
in order to ensure black majority representation in a ward system that overrepresents a black
minority in the new community. The district court in Richmond recognized this by distin-
guishing Petersburg when it formulated the "effectively eliminate" test in effect inquiry. City
of Richmond v. United States, 376 F. Supp. 1344, 1353 n.46 (D.D.C. 1974).
251. The Supreme Court would condone such overrepresentation "only in the most extraor-
dinary circumstances" as a last alternative to deannexation. See 422 U.S. 358, 373-75 (1975)
(dictum). Such circumstances may be held to exist in the future where an annexation greatly
depresses black voting strength beyond the point of "cure" under either Petersburg or
Richmond. In Richmond, black voting strength was diluted by a ten point drop in percentage
of total population. See note 175 supra and accompanying text.
252. The Supreme Court has recently granted certiorari in a case that directly involves
section 5 and benign districting. United Jewish Orgs., Inc. v. Wilson, 510 F.2d 512 (2d Cir.
1974), cert. granted sub nom. United Jewish Orgs., Inc. v. Carey, 96 S. Ct. 354 (1975).
253. Beer v. United States, 374 F. Supp. 357 (D.D.C.), juris. noted, 419 U.S. 822 (1974),
restored to calendar for reargument, 421 U.S. 945 (1975) (No. 73-1869) (Beer 1) (denial of
petition to set timetable for elections).
254. 376 F. Supp. at 1360. Judge Jones dissented from this portion of the decision. Id. at
1360-61.
255. 422 U.S. at 375.
256. The district court had spawned two theories supporting its claim of jurisdiction to
order deannexation. The court placed prime emphasis on "'the broad equitable jurisdiction
that inheres in courts to give effect to the policy of the legislature which they oversee." City
of Richmond v. United States, 376 F. Supp. 1344, 1359 (D.D.C. 1974), quoting Porter v.
Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 403 (1946). The court also made reference to the Federal
Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-02 (1970). 376 F. Supp. at 1359 n.75. Section
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the multitude of factors to be considered in resolving this difficult question
of remedy would ordinarily be more conveniently litigated before the local
district court, it may be argued that Congress never intended to go beyond
the plain meaning of section 5 in conferring jurisdiction upon another court
for the single purpose of deciding whether covered changes in voting proce-
dures and practices were discriminatory in purpose or effect. It would
appear, however, that this important question of statutory construction
has been resolved to the contrary without discussion by the Supreme
Court. 7
VI. PERSPECTIVES FOR THE FUTURE
The law of annexation is presently at a turning point in Virginia. Several
measures were introduced during the recently-completed session of the
Virginia General Assembly which embodied different views of the Stuart
Commission's report. 8 If the Commission's major recommendations are
adopted, city-county separation and resolution of annexation disputes by
the courts will remain intact. 9 The concept of selective county immunity
from involuntary annexation 210 by neighboring cities is certain to provoke
much debate.
While the mechanics of annexation in Virginia may change in the future,
it is unlikely that such annexations will escape scrutiny under section 5 of
2202 of that Act would appear to lend support to the court's claim of power to grant complete
relief, including deannexation, in declaratory judgment actions brought by covered jurisdic-
tions under section 5. "Further necessary or proper relief based on a declaratory judgment or
decree may be granted, after reasonable notice and hearing, against any adverse party whose
rights have been determined by such judgment." 28 U.S.C. § 2202 (1970). It has been noted,
however, that:
The Declaratory Judgment Act is not a grant of jurisdiction to the federal courts. It
merely makes available an additional remedy in cases of which they have jurisdiction
by virtue of diversity and the requisite amount in controversy, or because of a federal
question. C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK ON THE LAw OF FEDERAL CouRTs 449 (2d ed. 1970).
Whether Congress intended to incorporate section 2202 in its grant of jurisdiction to this
single district court to hear declaratory judgment actions brought by states and localities
covered by the Voting Rights Act is a problem of statutory construction.
257. It is possible that the Supreme Court will choose to clarify this issue when it renders
its forthcoming decision in the appeal from Beer v. United States, 374 F. Supp. 363 (D.D.C.),
juris. noted, 419 U.S. 822 (1974), restored to calendar for reargument, 421 U.S. 945 (1975)
(No. 73-1869) (Beer II). The district court followed its earlier decision in Beer I when it arrived
at the merits of the case in Beer I1. See 374 F. Supp. at 385 ("Our task is to determine whether
[the city's burden under section 5] has been discharged, and that is the only function we
have with respect to the controversy at hand.")
258. See note 90 supra.
259. See notes 66-69 supra and accompanying text.
260. See notes 84-89 supra and accompanying text.
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the Voting Rights Act before at least 1985. The Commonwealth's recent
failure to gain exemption from the Act's coverage"' would appear to post-
pone its removal from the list of covered jurisdictions at least until expira-
tion of the 1975 amendments to the Act.1 2 Thus, officials in Virginia cities
seeking annexation must continue to obtain prior federal approval by dem-
onstrating that the boundary change is nondiscriminatory in both purpose
and effect. Cities submitting requests for annexation accompanied by at-
large election systems may be required to change to single-member district
wards. Annexations which significantly reduce minority voting strength
may not be permitted at all, particularly if expansion in another direction
is a viable alternative.
Virginia cities may find the Attorney General of the United States more
willing to grant administrative preclearance in a close case if the
annexation is at least partially motivated by the effort to achieve integra-
tion of the local schools.2 3 Given the Supreme Court's unwillingness to
approve inter-district busing in the area of school desegregation, 26' officials
may successfully argue the existence of a compelling interest in expansion
in order to provide integrated public education within the community.
261. Virginia v. United States, 386 F. Supp. 1319 (D.D.C. 1974), afJ'd, 420 U.S. 901 (1975).
262. See notes 131-38 supra and accompanying text.
263. The district court found that no such purpose had motivated the original proponents
of the annexation in Richmond. City of Richmond v. United States, 376 F. Supp. 1344, 1354
n.50 (D.D.C. 1974). On appeal, the Attorney General emphasized the legitimate benefit of
the annexation as a factor contributing to the integration of the Richmond public schools.
Brief for the Federal Parties at 33-34, citing Bradley v. School Bd., 462 F.2d 1058, 1064 &
n.6 (4th Cir. 1972), aff'd per curiam by an equally divided court sub noa., School Bd. of City
of Richmond v. Board of Educ., 412 U.S. 92 (1973).
264. See, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
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